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NO JUSTICE IN UTAH’S JUSTICE COURTS: CONSTITUTIONAL 
ISSUES, SYSTEMIC PROBLEMS, AND THE FAILURE TO PROTECT 
DEFENDANTS IN UTAH’S INFAMOUS LOCAL COURTS† 
 
Samuel P. Newton,* Teresa L. Welch,** & Neal G. Hamilton*** 
 




Justice courts2 could be called the most loved and hated court in the judicial 
system. The justices of the peace who preside over the courts are equally 
polarizing figures. The courts have been called “a powerful, multifaceted, local 
legal institution”3 which “helped design and weave together the social, economic, 
and political fabric”4 of American society. They have also been called a “crooked-
                                                 
† The arguments and opinions expressed in this Article are based upon the 
experiences and research of the authors and do not signify the positions of Weber State 
University, the Salt Lake Legal Defender’s Association, or any other entity responsible for 
the representation of justice court defendants. 
* © 2012 Samuel P. Newton, is an assistant professor of criminal justice at Weber 
State University. Prior to this, he was a felony trial attorney for the Salt Lake Legal 
Defender Association. As a trial attorney, Mr. Newton handled hundreds of cases in Utah’s 
justice courts and he was one of the trial attorneys for the SLC v. Newman case addressed 
in this Article, where the Utah Supreme Court addressed certain writ rights afforded to 
justice court defendants. Mr. Newton is also completing his doctoral degree in History at 
the University of Utah. 
** © 2012 Teresa L. Welch is a felony trial attorney for the Salt Lake Legal Defender 
Association and an adjunct professor of criminal justice for Weber State University. She 
has handled hundreds of cases in Utah’s justice courts and, with Mr. Newton, she was one 
of the trial attorneys for the SLC v. Newman case addressed in this Article, where the Utah 
Supreme Court addressed certain writ rights afforded to justice court defendants. 
*** © 2012 Neal G. Hamilton is a felony trial attorney for the Salt Lake Legal 
Defender Association. He has handled hundreds of cases in Utah’s justice courts and has 
argued before the Utah Court of Appeals and the Utah Supreme Court about justice court 
issues. Mr. Hamilton is also the chairman of the Utah Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers (UACDL) legislative committee, which is spearheading efforts to reform justice 
courts through rule changes and legislative action. 
1 The Tick: Evil Sits Down for a Moment (Fox television broadcast Nov. 4, 1995). 
2 Not all jurisdictions call their local courts justice courts. For the purposes of this 
Article, a justice court refers to a city or county court whose jurisdiction is limited to class 
B and C misdemeanors and infractions. 
3 JOHN R. WUNDER, INFERIOR COURTS, SUPERIOR JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF THE 
JUSTICES OF THE PEACE ON THE NORTHWEST FRONTIER, 1853–1889,  19 (1979). 
4 Id. at 169. 
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a**, f***ing thing.”5 One man summed up his opinion of these judges and courts 
by stating, “[l]ook up extortion in your Black’s Law Dictionary, and you’ll see 
justice courts.”6 
As in other American states, Utah’s experiment with justice courts began with 
a need to administer local justice during a time when courts were few and far 
between. Justice courts were created to provide locally administered legal services 
to areas in which new populations were moving. Justices of the peace—typically 
nonlegally trained, but highly regarded community figures—became the de facto 
judges of these justice of the peace courts. Yet these century-old courts face 
significant growing pains in modern society given that Utah’s increased 
urbanization, modernization, and now significant attorney population have 
eliminated the justifications underlying the justice courts’ creation. 
Utah’s recent attempts to reform its justice courts shows a genuine desire to 
modernize the courts to ensure their relevance and effectiveness in the state’s 
justice system, but these revisions ultimately fail to fix the problems plaguing these 
courts. 
This Article examines the problems inherent in Utah’s justice court system 
and proposes solutions to those problems. Part I examines the origins and 
development of justice courts in England, the United States, and Utah in order to 
provide context for the current debate and to illustrate that the initial motivations 
and justifications for the courts no longer exist in the twenty-first century. 
Part II discusses the numerous constitutional, structural, and procedural 
problems inherent in the justice courts. Justice courts continue to raise potential 
constitutional violations, including violations of separation of powers, due process, 
equal protection, and double jeopardy. Additionally, the courts appear to focus on 
revenue generation (rather than justice or law enforcement), continue to allow 
nonlawyer judges to impose relatively serious sanctions for fairly minor offenses, 
and unfairly incarcerate individuals who elect to pursue a new trial through the 
appellate process. These problems severely undermine the rights of justice court 
defendants and the very legitimacy of Utah’s judicial system. 
Part III proposes solutions to these problems. The first and most drastic 
proposal is to abolish Utah’s justice courts entirely. As will be shown, the 
fundamental reasons that drove the creation of justice courts no longer exist in 
Utah. Moreover, the problems inherent to the courts outweigh any benefits they 
provide. Alternatively, this Article proposes several reforms aimed at improving 
the courts’ numerous internal problems. These alternative reforms include 
increasing the use of legally-trained and licensed judges, implementing sentencing 
guidelines, making justice courts “courts of record” so as to facilitate more just 
appeals, simplifying the appellate stay procedure, and eliminating justice courts’ 
jurisdiction over particular charges—namely enhanceable charges such as DUIs 
                                                 
5 Eric S. Peterson, Nickeled and Dimed: Utah’s Justice Courts Exact Their Pound of 
Flesh, SALT LAKE CITY WKLY., May 27, 2010, at 18, available at http://e.cityweekly.net/ 
cityweekly#2010/05/27/s1/?article=884757&z=49. 
6 Id. at 19. 
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and domestic violence offenses. Such changes are needed to effectively protect the 
constitutional rights of justice court defendants. 
 
I.  THE HISTORY OF JUSTICE COURTS IN ENGLAND,  
THE UNITED STATES, AND UTAH 
 
Justice courts have a unique and varied history in England, the United States, 
and here in Utah. In England, justices, given limited jurisdiction and power, 
expanded and then abused their power, eventually forcing the British to eliminate 
the office altogether. In the United States, justice courts became an important part 
of the justice system during westward expansion, particularly in less populated 
areas. However, as in England, the courts came to be characterized by corruption 
and incompetence, eventually leading to reform efforts and, in some cases, outright 
abolition. Utah followed a similar path, though with its own twists and turns, 
rooted in the state’s unique settlement history and early population. 
An examination of the history of the justice courts, particularly the reasons 
justifying their creation, enables one to fully understand the justice courts’ 
composition and role (or lack thereof) in the twenty-first century. Moreover, 
examination of this history shows that justice courts no longer serve the purposes 
that initially justified their creation. 
 
A.  History of the Justice of the Peace in England 
 
Of all the institutions in the English government the justice of the peace 
is the most frequently abused.7 
 
In England, the office of justice of the peace, the precursor to the justice court 
judge, developed gradually. When King Richard I left on a crusade to Jerusalem in 
the thirteenth century, he directed knights who remained behind to keep the peace 
and arrest lawbreakers.8 Richard’s successor, King John, rewarded the knights9 as 
well as prominent landowners10 for their loyalty and information with the formal 
title of “keepers of the peace.”11 The keepers were initially intended to be the 
king’s eyes and ears in different parts of the country, but they soon were asked to 
help sheriffs arrest offenders.12 
                                                 
7 E.C.S. Wade, Book Review, 2 U. TORONTO L.J. 398, 398 (1938) (reviewing L. 
PAGE, JUSTICE OF THE PEACE (1936)). 
8 James A. Gazell, A National Perspective on Justices of the Peace and Their Future: 
Time for an Epitaph?, 46 MISS. L.J. 795, 796 (1975). 
9 WUNDER, supra note 3, at 3. 
10 See id. 
11 THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 167 (5th 
ed. 1956). 
12 CHARLES AUSTIN BEARD, THE OFFICE OF JUSTICE OF THE PEACE IN ENGLAND IN ITS 
ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT 19 (1904); PLUCKNETT, supra note 11, at 167; Gazell, supra 
note 8, at 796; see also Robert S. Keebler, Our Justice of the Peace Courts—A Problem in 
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Eventually, the Crown appointed wealthy landholders as keepers and asked 
them to serve, without pay, as “conservators of the peace.”13 The conservators 
lacked judicial authority but increasingly began, outside the scope of their 
authority, to receive indictments and arraign and imprison offenders pending 
trial.14 Parliament formally assented to this expansion of judicial authority in 
1330.15 Soon, the conservators further enlarged their authority to trying defendants, 
and “had developed so many community legal responsibilities that they were only 
one step away from becoming full-fledged members of the English judiciary.”16 
During the Edwardian War (of the Hundred Years’ War) and the Black Death, 
Edward III “needed new judicial machinery to bring peace back to his realm.”17 He 
issued an executive order in 1349 called the Statute of Laborers, ratified by 
Parliament in 1351, which set wage and price controls, and authorized the 
conservators of the peace to enforce the act.18 The Statute created a scenario 
typical of the controversies in today’s justice courts. Because the king was not 
directly present in many parts of England, he had little choice but to select local 
landowners to serve as justices since they were “the only possible wielders” of 
power, and the people had a strong desire to be “controlled by men of their own 
                                                 
Justice, 9 TENN. L. REV. 1, 6 (1930) (“[T]hey swept the streets at night with spies, arresting 
on the slightest pretext to extort bail fees which their clerks were forced to split with 
them.”). At common law, only sheriffs (in the absence of a landholding baron) had powers 
to arrest persons to bring before a judge and generally to keep the peace. See CAMERON 
CHURCHILL & A. CARMICHAEL BRUCE, THE LAW OF THE OFFICE AND DUTIES OF THE 
SHERIFF 1–2 (London, Stevens & Sons 1879). They also summoned and supervised juries, 
presided over elections, attended executions of criminals ultimately certifying the person as 
dead. Id. at 41–49, 112–38. 
13 WUNDER, supra note 3, at 3; see also Gazell, supra note 8, at 796 (“This system of 
remuneration, however, fell into disuse as the Crown wanted to reduce public expenditures. 
Such desuetude, as well as a law barring lords from accepting payment for their judicial 
services, tended to lead to the appointment of the propertied and opulent classes over 
commoners and to presage a tradition that the justice of the peace served without pay.”). 
The practice of no remuneration continued until 1835. Keebler, supra note 12, at 6. 
14 WUNDER, supra note 3, at 4. 
15 Id.; see also Keebler, supra note 12, at 6 (“By subsequent statutes during the same 
reign, certain judicial powers were conferred upon the Conservators, which were gradually 
enlarged, and the appellation of Justice of the Peace was given them.”). 
16 PLUCKNETT, supra note 11, at 167; WUNDER, supra note 3, at 4. England did not 
lack a judiciary at the time—county courts existed since the “kingdom was divided into 
shires or counties” and the Court of Common Pleas, the King’s (or Queen’s) Bench, and 
the Commission of Assize existed since the Magna Carta. 8 THE AMERICAN LAW REGISTER 
66–68 (James T. Mitchell et al. eds., 1869). England also had a well-developed appellate 
system. Id. at 68–71. 
17 E.g., WUNDER, supra note 3, at 4–5. 
18 Id. at 5. England’s population dropped from four million to two and a half million 
from before the Black Death to 1350. Id. 
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kind.”19 However, the king feared local control would undermine his own power, 
so he required that superior, or assize, judges supervise the justices.20 In effect, the 
justices of laborers reflected “a generally acceptable balance between control and 
efficiency, between the interests of the crown and those of the local 
communities.”21 
The power of the justices was expanded again by “sitting collectively four 
times per year” with several other justices and clerics (or law-trained persons) to 
create the Court of Quarter Sessions.22 This was under the king’s directive, and the 
king himself chose the members who sat. This court compelled sheriffs to “send to 
the justices of the peace all indictments brought in their tourns.”23 This dealt a 
“death blow to the judicial power of the sheriffs.”24 Eventually, Parliament 
formalized the justices’ increased use of power with the Justice of the Peace Act in 
1361.25 The act critically transformed the justices of laborers from keepers of the 
peace, whose sole duty was to handle rudimentary and initial criminal proceedings, 
into “justices of the peace,” who had the power to arrest, indict, and try those 
accused of crimes.26 Justices of the peace could only handle initial appearances on 
felonies, but they had nearly unfettered reign over misdemeanors. Under the 
justices’ continuing authority to “keep the peace,” they could arrest rioters or peace 
breakers, including those who refused to disperse.27 They could order any person 
arrested or order a search of a person or property.28 In “a radical departure from the 
common law” justices began to try these cases without juries.29 In short, through 
                                                 
19 See JOHN H. LANGBEIN ET AL., HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 231 (2009) (citing ALAN HARDING, A SOCIAL 
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 70 (1966)). 
20 See id. 
21 Edward Powell, The Administration of Criminal Justice in Late-Medieval England: 
Peace Sessions and Assizes, in THE POLITICAL CONTEXT OF LAW: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
SEVENTH BRITISH LEGAL HISTORY CONFERENCE CANTERBURY 1985, at 57 (Richard Eales 
& David Sullivan eds., 1987). 
22 LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 19, at 230; see also Katherine Beaty Chiste, The 
Justice of the Peace in History: Community and Restorative Justice, 68 SASK. L. REV. 153, 
155 (2005) (“Quarter sessions of J.P. courts began to replace the old county courts as the 
real governing assembly of the county, one which reported to the King and not to the 
baron.”). 
23 Bertha H. Putnam, Introduction to PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE JUSTICES OF THE 
PEACE IN THE FOURTEENTH AND FIFTEENTH CENTURIES xxxvii (Bertha H. Putnam ed., 
1938). 
24 Id.; see C. WARREN HOLLISTER ET AL., THE MAKING OF ENGLAND TO 1399, at 333 
(8th ed. 2001). 
25 Justices of the Peace Act, 1361, 34 Edw. 3, c. 1. (Eng.), available at http://www. 
legislation.gov.uk/aep/Edw3/34/1. 
26 WUNDER, supra note 3, at 5. 
27 LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 19, at 234–35. 
28 Id. 
29 E.g., LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 19, at 234; WUNDER, supra note 3, at 6. 
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the act, Parliament effectively, but not formally, transformed local land-owning 
magistrates into crown judges. 
Over the next few centuries, Parliament rarely met without giving the justices 
of the peace even more power or expanding their number. These actions 
transformed the justices into what some have called the essence of local 
government because they “made local government work.”30 But in spite of their 
rise, these courts soon fell into disfavor. Many criticized the justices as “inept, 
ignorant, and incapable [of] policing their society satisfactorily.”31 Some claimed 
the justices displayed an “ignorance in jurisprudence”32 and that “few care to 
undertake, and fewer to understand the office.”33 One critic complained that the 
“justices line their pockets with toll taken from pick-pockets and keepers of 
disorderly houses; and they swept the streets at night with spies, arresting on the 
slightest pretext to extort bail fees which their clerks were forced to split with 
them.”34 Edmund Burke, the great British statesman and supporter of the American 
Revolution exclaimed that the justices of the peace “were generally the scum of the 
earth; some of whom were notorious men of such infamous character that they 
were unworthy of any employ whatever, and others so ignorant that they could 
scarcely write their own names.”35 Irrespective of praise or criticism, the growth of 
the justices of the peace ranks and the expansion of their authority significantly 
affected British society. Justices of the peace had become the “rulers of the 
county.”36 
This system became the model exported to the American colonies. 
Interestingly enough, England (Great Britain) no longer has justices of the peace. 
England’s experiment failed because the justices were given (and took for 
themselves) too much power, and then abused it. These abuses soured the country 
on the office itself, and eventually lead to the abolition of justice of the peace 
courts altogether. American states, Utah most of all, have not had the benefit of 
seven-hundred years of experimentation with justices of the peace, and thus have 
not realized that the problems in the system are intractable. As will be shown, 
American states, including Utah, could learn from this experience. 
 
                                                 
30 WUNDER, supra note 3, at 6–7 (quoting WALLACE NOTESTEIN, THE ENGLISH 
PEOPLE ON THE EVE OF COLONIZATION 1603–1630, at 227 (1954)); LANGBEIN ET AL., supra 
note 19, at 234–36. 
31 Kathleen S. Murphy, Judge, Jury, Magistrate and Soldier: Rethinking Law and 
Authority in Late Eighteenth-Century Ireland, 44 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 231, 245 (2000). 
32 Id. at 244 (quoting LEONARD MACNALLY, THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE FOR 
IRELAND: CONTAINING THE AUTHORITIES AND DUTIES OF THAT OFFICE, at v (1808)). 
33 Id. at 245 (quoting LEONARD MACNALLY, THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE FOR 
IRELAND: CONTAINING THE AUTHORITIES AND DUTIES OF THAT OFFICE, at v, vi (1808)). 
34 Keebler, supra note 12, at 8. 
35 Id. 
36 F. W. MAITLAND, JUSTICE AND POLICE 80 (1885). 
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B.  History of the Justice of the Peace in America 
 
Justices of the Peace were exported to the British colonies beginning with 
Jamestown in 1607.37 They constituted an integral part of colonial administration 
from the West Indies to the Chesapeake.38 As in England, a justice of the peace did 
not have to be legally trained, though Americans were more likely to select justices 
with a legal education or background.39 
However, during westward expansion, a short supply of legally-trained 
individuals necessitated courts headed by laymen, many of whom were paid from 
the fees they collected.40 These justices shared little with their English counterparts 
beyond the title of “justice of the peace,” since they “dispense[d] with technical 
forms and pleadings, and require[d] causes to be disposed of with as little delay 
and expense as possible.”41 Justices of the peace spread throughout the West, and 
became “the primary judicial representatives of frontier residents in new 
communities.”42  
Americans, particularly in rural Western areas, disfavored judges with formal 
legal training. Lawyers were viewed as obfuscators and oppressors because of their 
ability to interpret a complex web of common law decisions.43 Frontier justices 
themselves eschewed legal training, believing that ordinary people were just as 
capable of resolving disputes as lawyers. However, as a territory’s population 
grew, inadequacies of this “rural-justice” model often came to a head and 
consequently, the use of judges who had no legal training fell out of favor. 
Moreover, caseloads grew with population, and legally trained judges were seen as 
more able to handle the increased workload of the job in these growing cities.44 
With this shift, states increasingly sought judges with legal training.45 Larger cities, 
                                                 
37 Gazell, supra note 8, at 797. 
38 BRENDAN MCCONVILLE, THE KING’S THREE FACES: THE RISE AND FALL OF ROYAL 
AMERICA 1688–1776, at 149–50 (2006); WUNDER, supra note 3, at 7. See generally 
TREVOR BURNARD, MASTERY, TYRANNY, AND DESIRE: THOMAS THISTLEWOOD AND HIS 
SLAVES IN THE ANGLO-JAMAICAN WORLD (2004) (chronicling the life of one justice of the 
peace, Thomas Thistlewood, in British colonial Jamaica). 
39 See WUNDER, supra note 3, at 7–8. 
40 Eric H. Steele, The Historical Context of Small Claims Courts, 1981 AM. B. 
FOUND. RES. J. 293, 326; WUNDER, supra note 3, at 9. 
41 Steele, supra note 40, at 326–27 (quoting Robert McMurdy, The Law Providing for 
a Municipal Court in Chicago: Address Delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Illinois 
State Bar Association, 38 CHI. LEGAL NEWS 398 (1906)). 
42 WUNDER, supra note 3, at 18–19. 
43 Steele, supra note 40, at 302. 
44 See Ditty v. Hampton, 490 S.W.2d 772, 776 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973). 
45 Chester H. Smith, The Justice of the Peace System in the United States, 15 CALIF. 
L. REV. 118, 131–35 (1927); see e.g., Donald P. Kommers, The Emergence of Law and 
Justice in Pre-Territorial Wisconsin, 8 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 20, 30–32 (1964) (describing 
Wisconsin’s replacement of a justice of the peace with a lawyer, Justice Doty, who 
reformed the justice courts toward a more common law approach). 
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with bigger populations, also had greater financial ability to pay for professional 
judges and had more attorneys to staff the courts.46  
In spite of their substantial role, nineteenth century critics attacked justices of 
the peace and their methods. Some complained that the justices of the peace 
abused their position and power. One judge asked litigants to call him “the 
Worshipful Justice of the Peace.”47 Other justices were alleged to have prevented 
people from voting, and having helped enforce slavery.48 Justices were accused, 
albeit anecdotally, of bizarre methods of “frontier-justice.” For example, one 
Wisconsin justice of the peace would rule in favor of the person who brought him 
the best liquor.49Another justice simply refused to apply the law, stating “I don’t 
have a law book in the office, and that isn’t all—I don’t want any. I do what I think 
is right . . . .”50 A California justice of the peace allegedly smelled defendants 
claiming he could “identify an honest person by his scent.”51 
Critics further complained that the courts were unsupervised,52 controlled by 
political machines, “served at the pleasure of the party or person in power,”53 and 
operated their courts as moneymaking ventures.54 Opponents called justices of the 
peace “public menace[s] . . . to be resisted with grim determination.”55 Significant 
problems were found with the lack of a formal record, “which resulted in 
numerous trials de novo on appeal.” 56 Some claimed the judges were incompetent 
and had failed to fulfill their purpose.57 One early critic complained that their 
appellate process and concurrent jurisdiction wasted judicial resources.58 The 
                                                 
46 Ditty, 490 S.W.2d at 776. 
47 WUNDER, supra note 3, at 13. 
48 Id. at 13, 17–18. 
49 Kommers, supra note 45, at 27 n.37. 
50 C.B.S., Note, Limiting Judicial Incompetence: The Due Process Right to a Legally 
Learned Judge in State Minor Court Criminal Proceedings, 61 VA. L. REV. 1454, 1456 
(1975). 
51 Id. at 1456. 
52 JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 149 
(1950); Smith, supra note 45, at 140–41 (“They are often ignorant and wholly uncontrolled 
by statute or constitution. Their decisions are purely personal.”). States did little to develop 
a supervisory organization beyond providing for de novo appeals. Id. at 129. 
53 Steele, supra note 40, at 329. 
54 HURST, supra note 52, at 327; Smith, supra note 45, at 140 (“The pernicious fee 
system and local politics break down their integrity and lead to corruption.”). 
55 Steele, supra note 40, at 327 (quoting Manual Levine, Conciliation Court of 
Cleveland, Address Before the American Political Science Association (Dec. 30, 1914), in 
2 J. AM. JUD. SOC’Y 10 (1918)). 
56 Gazell, supra note 8, at 800. 
57 Thomas Patterson, Jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace, and the Possible 
Application in Pennsylvania of the Small Debtors’ Court on the English Plan, 45 AM. L. 
REG. & REV. 481, 481 (1897); see, e.g., Steele, supra note 40, at 328. 
58 Gazell, supra note 8, at 799–800. 
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collective problems inherent to the courts were undermining the justice system as a 
whole.59 In short: 
 
Much of the criticism of the justice of the peace system thus is 
almost the exact opposite of the criticism of the regular courts. Where the 
regular courts were accused of allowing too little judicial discretion, the 
justice of the peace was criticized for the excessive discretion he 
exercised. Justices of the peace were also criticized for their lack of 
training. The major thrust of the criticism was that because of 
incompetence and bias, substantial justice could not be had in the justice 
courts. This resulted in delay and expense for the litigant, a cluttering of 
the regular courts with cases on appeal, and a diminishing of respect for 
justice on the part of the public.60 
 
This was a dramatic about-face, as many of the defining virtues of justice courts 
supporting their creation and continuation—lay interpretation, speed, and closeness 
to the people—came to be seen as systemic weaknesses.61 
These criticisms led to an increased movement to disband justice courts or 
alternatively to require justices of the peace to have legal training.62 Reformers 
sought to “wipe out the disgrace of our inferior courts,” since most citizens’ only 
encounter with the justice system would be in a justice court.63 In 1906, Chicago 
was the first to abolish its justice courts, and several other states followed in the 
1920s.64 By the 1960s, the abolition movement escalated with a vengeance. Nearly 
every major study or group that looked at the justice of the peace system either 
“explicitly or implicitly sought the abolition of justices of the peace.”65 In the 
1960s and 1970s, more than a dozen states eliminated the office of justice of the 
                                                 
59 Smith, supra note 45, at 140–41 (“The administration of justice by these lay 
magistrates is uncertain, unequal and unstable, and in truth, the system as such, is a denial 
of justice according to our highest conception of the term.”). 
60 Steele, supra note 40, at 329. 
61 Id. at 327. 
62 Herbert Harley, Administering Justice in Cities, in 136 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & 
SOC. SCI. 87, 87 (1928). 
63 Id. at 94; Smith, supra note 45, at 140–41 (“The importance of the justice of the 
peace system cannot be over-estimated for it is in these minor courts that most of our 
citizens come in contact with our judicial organization.”). 
64 Harley, supra note 62, at 89–94. 
65 Gazell, supra note 8, at 800. This included the American Bar Association, the 
American Judicature Society, the National Municipal League, the Institute for Judicial 
Administration, the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of 
Justice, the Committee on Economic Development, the National Advisory Commission on 
Civil Disorders, the National Conference on the Judiciary, the Advisory Commission on 
Intergovernmental Relations, and the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice 
Standards and Goals. Id. at 800–01. 
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peace.66 Another dozen states did not formally eliminate the office, but restricted 
its jurisdiction or power.67 The pace of abolition snowballed: as more and more 
states abolished or significantly reformed their justice courts, other states could 
justifiably join the trend.68 This rapid change prompted some to predict the demise 
of the justice of the peace system.69 However, predictions of the total demise of the 
justice courts proved incorrect. After 1975, only five states took action to eliminate 
the office,70 leaving few states with justice court systems. 
The United States lacks uniform professional requirements for its justice court 
judges. Many states require judges to have legal training.71 Some require a law 
license, while others also require justices to have practiced law for at least a time.72 
                                                 
66 These states include Alabama, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, 
Michigan, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Vermont, and West Virginia. 
Gazell, supra note 8, at 808–10. Iowa established a unified trial court, the district court, in 
1973, abolishing 500 justice of the peace courts, 899 mayor’s courts, fourteen municipal 
courts and thirty-four police courts. Methods of Judicial Selection: Limited Jurisdiction 
Courts, AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/ 
methods/limited_jurisdiction_courts.cfm (last visited Nov. 23, 2011). 
67 For example in 1961, Washington state eliminated the Justice Courts in its largest 
counties and let smaller counties determine whether to keep Justices of the Peace. All but 
seven counties eliminated the position. Delaware made the justice of the peace state 
officials under direct supervision of the state supreme court. Kansas, in 1972, eliminated 
the Justice Courts’ ability to have virtually any power as the state reduced a court’s 
jurisdiction to $1 and abolished constitutional references to the office. Several states, such 
as Texas, Montana, Georgia, Mississippi, Louisiana and Kentucky, had a more difficult 
time enacting changes to the existing structure. Voters in Montana and Nevada rejected 
constitutional amendments to change the office. For some states, like Mississippi and 
Georgia, locating the justices of the peace proved to be a difficult endeavor. Georgia’s 
attempt to locate its justices of the peace turned up 1,728 justices by 1975. Mississippi’s 
legislature recommended in 1970 reducing the number of justices of the peace from 500 to 
200. Gazell, supra note 8, at 808–12. 
68 Id. at 813. 
69 Id. at 813 (“[T]he time may soon be at hand to write an appropriate epitaph for this 
office, especially since 31 states have progressed toward the abolition of this position and 
its counterparts. . . . It is likely that all the states will have replaced this institution before 
the end of the 20th century. . . . If states continue to act as they have since 1971, all states 
will have eliminated (or have moved toward the abolition of) justices of the peace by 1981 
at the earliest.”). 
70 Methods of Judicial Selection: Limited Jurisdiction Courts, supra note 66. In 
November 2000, Arkansas voters approved the merger of their smaller courts (i.e. 
municipal courts, justice of the peace courts, corporation courts, police courts, and courts 
of common pleas) into one court—the district court. Id. 
71 Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, 
Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, 
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, and 
Wisconsin. See id. 
72 Id. (listing law practice period of usually three to ten years). 
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Other states, including Utah, continue to allow nonlawyers to adjudicate some 
criminal matters.73 Most states require municipal/local judges to be at least 
eighteen- or twenty-one-years old,74 to be United States citizens and state residents, 
and to read and write English.75 Others merely require a high school diploma.76 
Some jurisdictions require judges to undergo annual training.77  
There are also a variety of selection and removal mechanisms in place for 
justice court judges across the United States. The most common method of both 
appointment and retention is by some form of election; two thirds of the states 
follow this method.78 Several states appoint judges through the governor, city, or 
county council and many either retain them for life or by reappointment through 
the same process.79 
Finally, the criminal jurisdiction of municipal nonlegally trained justices of 
the peace varies greatly across America. Many states allow the nonlegally trained 
justice to have jurisdiction over misdemeanor and traffic offenses.80 
Like in England, most states’ experiment with the justice of the peace system 
led to abuses of power and to severe criticisms—which ultimately resulted in 
                                                 
73 Arizona, Delaware, Indiana, Mississippi, Montana, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, 
Oregon, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Washington, and West Virginia. Id. 
74 Idaho requires its magistrates to be at least thirty years of age. Id. Some 
jurisdictions, like Louisiana, set an upper age limit of age 70. Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. The Colorado municipal court requires only a high school diploma or 
equivalent, though the municipality may require the judge to be an elector of the 
municipality or county. 
77 Id. Texas, Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin require municipal judges to undergo 
annual training in the range of twenty to forty hours annually. Colorado allows nonlawyers 
to serve as municipal judges, but municipalities must give preference to law-trained 
applicants. Id. Georgia created the office of magistrate, a non-law-trained position with 
very limited jurisdiction and authority. Id. Indiana allows cities to set judge qualifications; 
some require legal training. Id. New Mexico allows judges without legal training in cities 
with a population less than 200,000. Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. In Alabama, for example, justices of the peace (or municipal judges) are 
appointed by the municipality and are subject to reappointment by the municipality, 
whereas in Arizona, non-lawyer justices of the peace are selected and retained by a partisan 
election. Id. 
80 Id. In Arizona, for example, a municipal judge and a justice of the peace have 
jurisdiction over misdemeanors, domestic violence, and traffic cases. Id. In Delaware, 
justices of the peace hear traffic cases and non-jury misdemeanors, while Aldermen hear 
misdemeanors and traffic and parking violations. Id. Indiana’s city and town courts 
adjudicate ordinance violations, misdemeanors, and infractions. Id. Mississippi and 
Montana allow their justice courts to hear misdemeanors and preliminary hearings. Id. 
Oregon gives its municipal courts jurisdiction over state liquor law violations and non-
felonious state traffic offenses. Id. In South Carolina, a magistrate or municipal court 
judge’s jurisdiction in limited to criminal cases in which the penalty is no greater than 
thirty days incarceration or a $500 fine. Id. Utah’s justice courts only have jurisdiction for 
offenses that carry less than 180 days of incarceration. Id. 
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abolition or limitation of the power of the justice of the peace. Utah, however, 
continues to hold on to the antiquated system. 
 
C.  History of the Justice of the Peace in Utah 
 
Like other states, Utah also imported justices of the peace to its newly created 
territory. Utah’s unique history helps explain its continued commitment to justice 
courts. Prior to obtaining territorial status in 1850, Utah’s legal system consisted of 
ecclesiastical courts. Governor Brigham Young appointed Mormon bishops as 
“magistrates of the ward,” who resolved legal disputes in addition to carrying out 
church responsibilities.81 When Congress created the Utah territory in 1850, 
bishops continued to act as Utah’s first justices of the peace.82 
Soon after the creation of the territory, Congress dispatched three federal 
judges to establish a formal judicial presence. However, upon arrival at least one 
judge “found an empty docket” as Mormons continued to use church courts.83 
Almost immediately after arrival, the other two judges clashed with the Mormons 
and left the territory. They complained to President Fillmore of Mormons’ “lawless 
acts” and “denunciation[s] so violent and so offensive as to set at defiance . . . [the] 
just administration of laws.”84 
The conflict intensified. Mormons saw federal courts “as serious threats to 
their rights of self-governance and religious distinctiveness.”85 Judges, in turn, saw 
Mormon resistance as evidencing their un-American attitudes and lawlessness.86 
Mormons, however, also believed their ecclesiastical courts, in which the common 
law rules were often ignored, were better suited to the community.87 Because of 
Mormons’ desire to avoid the federal courts for all matters, the territorial 
legislature granted exclusive criminal jurisdiction to locally-controlled probate 
courts, which traditionally handled wills and estates. The Mormons’ position 
aggravated the already strained position between the nation’s desire to administer 
                                                 
81 WUNDER, supra note 3, at 18; RICHARD S. VAN WAGONER, MORMON POLYGAMY: 
A HISTORY 107–08 (2d ed. 1989). 
82 WUNDER, supra note 3, at 18. 
83 EDWARD BROWN FIRMAGE & RICHARD COLLIN MANGRUM, ZION IN THE COURTS: A 
LEGAL HISTORY OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, 1830–1900, at 
215–16 (1988); see also KATHRYN M. DAYNES, MORE WIVES THAN ONE: 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE MORMON MARRIAGE SYSTEM, 1840–1910, at 40–41 (2001) 
(describing the early church courts and the creation of federal courts). 
84 CONG. GLOBE, 32d Cong., 1ST SESS. app. 86 (1851); FIRMAGE & MANGRUM, supra 
note 83, at 215; 3 B.H. ROBERTS, A COMPREHENSIVE HISTORY OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS-
CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS 522–23 (1930); James B. Allen, The Unusual Jurisdiction 
of County Probate Courts in the Territory of Utah, 36 UTAH HIST. Q. 132, 135 (1968). 
85 FIRMAGE & MANGRUM, supra note 83, at 216. 
86
 Id. 
87 DAYNES, supra note 83, at 41. For example, the territorial legislature required 
attorneys to present any fact to a court, even if those facts were adverse to their clients’ 
interests, a common practice in ecclesiastical courts. FIRMAGE & MANGRUM, supra note 
83, at 218 (citing 1852 Utah Laws 37, §5). 
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common law justice with its federal courts and Mormons’ desire to keep justice 
local with their probate courts.88 In response, the federal courts ordered United 
States Marshals to ignore the commands of probate courts; probate courts in turn 
ordered the marshals to quash the orders of federal courts.89 One federal judge 
ordered that any criminal conviction from a probate court be overturned for lack of 
jurisdiction, which resulted in the release of a man sentenced and incarcerated for 
assault with intent to kill.90 
This conflict ultimately became part of the cause of the Utah War, in which 
the federal government dispatched the majority of the United States Army to the 
Utah Territory with instructions to quell the Mormon insurrection.91 Though the 
Army never fired a shot, its presence—coupled with a series of United States 
Supreme Court decisions and Congressional Acts which disincorporated the 
Mormon Church, allowed for the prosecution of Mormon polygamists, and 
eliminated Mormons’ ability to hold political office—allowed federal officials to 
obtain the Mormon church’s capitulation.92 The church surrendered its practice of 
polygamy, agreed to participate politically in the United States, and agreed to 
recognize the jurisdiction of federal courts. 93 
The Mormons’ surrender allowed Utah to formally enter the Union in 1896, 
and the new state constitution provided for justices of the peace.94 There is little 
evidence of the framers’ motive to include the office. Only one of the framers of 
the Utah Constitution commented about justice courts, and it was to affirm that 
justice court decisions could be appealed de novo.95 One could plausibly attribute 
justice courts’ inclusion in the Constitution to the significant distrust of federal 
authority considering the prior conflict and Mormons’ preference for locally 
                                                 
88 Allen, supra note 84, at 135–39. 
89 Id. at 135–40. 
90 Id. at 136. 
91 See generally 1 WILLIAM P. MACKINNON, AT SWORD’S POINT: A DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE UTAH WAR TO 1858 (2008) (documenting the Utah War); DONALD R. 
MOORMAN & GENE R. SESSIONS, CAMP FLOYD AND THE MORMONS: THE UTAH WAR 
(1992) (same). 
92 See generally SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE MORMON QUESTION: POLYGAMY 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (2002) (tracing the 
early history of the church and its struggle with the federal government). 
93 See generally THOMAS G. ALEXANDER, MORMONISM IN TRANSITION: A HISTORY 
OF THE LATTER-DAY SAINTS, 1890–1930, at 3–4 (1986) (describing the incorporation of 
Utah into the United States); GORDON, supra note 92, at 219–24 (discussing “the 
abandonment of Mormons’ claim to a constitutional right” to polygamy); B. CARMON 
HARDY, SOLEMN COVENANT: THE MORMON POLYGAMOUS PASSAGE 284–309 (1992) 
(following the encounters between Utah and progressives in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century, as Utah became integrated into the United States); Jonathan H. Moyer, 
Dancing With the Devil: The Making of the Mormon-Republican Pact, at iv–v (Aug. 2009) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Utah) (discussing how the Mormon church 
joined the political mainstream). 
94 UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 8 (repealed 1984). 
95 2 UTAH PROCEEDINGS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1507–08 (1895). 
40 UTAH ONLAW [NO. 1 
controlled judicial systems. Moreover, some evidence supports the proposition that 
justice courts arose because rural areas could not afford professional courts and 
state courts were few and far between.96 
As previously discussed, after Utah’s statehood, states around the nation 
moved to abolish or reform their justice of the peace courts. For some reason, 
Utah’s justice court system remained fundamentally unchanged and largely 
unchallenged until the 1970s when the Utah Legislature authorized its Legislative 
Council to study the state’s court system.97 After a year of study, the Legislative 
Council identified numerous problems so serious and weighty that the council 
recommended dissolving the justice courts and transferring their cases to the 
district courts.98  
The council was concerned that justice courts varied excessively in the quality 
of justice they dispensed. “[E]xperience, training, compensation, temperment [sic] 
and attitude” varied greatly, with the greatest problems occurring in justice 
courts.99 The council was further troubled because many justice courts operated in 
“outmoded and improperly maintained courtrooms” with “poor . . . fixtures and 
furniture.”100 It emphasized that “some local governments provide their courts with 
adequate funds and facilities, while others are given minimal attention.”101 Most 
troubling to the council was the fact that justices of the peace were still paid on a 
case-by-case basis.102 Paying by the case resulted, the council said, in judicial 
salaries ranging from $100 to $30,000 annually.103 “[I]t became evident that some 
local court judges consistently levied higher fines than other judges for similar 
violations.”104 The council was especially concerned that few justices even 
possessed state law mandated copies of the Utah Code and a handbook created by 
the Utah Supreme Court.105 
The council had additional concerns about the state’s justice courts. They 
noted that cities treated justice courts as revenue-driven entities, since fee 
collection seemed to be the largest motivation for creating a justice court.106 They 
were further concerned that even though justice courts were the most “highly 
visible” court in the state, there was a “leadership void” where “no one person or 
                                                 
96 See Benjamin Will Bates, Exploring Justice Courts in Utah and Three Problems 
Inherent in the Justice Court System, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 731, 737–38. 
97 UTAH LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, UTAH COURTS TOMORROW: REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE UNIFIED COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE 1 (1972). 
98 Id. at 3. Part of the reason the council recommended dissolving the courts instead of 
reform was because historically reform had “largely been resisted” and “attempts to 
improve the overall operation of [justice] courts [had] never succeeded.” Id. at 10. 






105 Id. at 12. 
106 See id. at 13. 
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group” was responsible for the operation of the courts.107 The disparity of having 
each municipality dispense its own version of justice resulted in an inconsistent 
and arbitrary system: “any malfunction in court administration at this level reflects 
in the public’s eyes on the operation of the entire court system.”108 
The council recommended court unification—eliminating justice courts and 
assigning their cases to the district courts—as the solution to these problems.109 
Such reform had additional benefits. Since Utah’s transportation system had 
evolved dramatically since the justice courts’ creation, Utahns no longer needed 
courts in remote places.110 Unification would resolve issues of communication 
between justice and district courts.111 It would also eliminate forum shopping.112 
State funding of all courts would eliminate concerns that justice courts operated 
merely to collect revenue, since “all courts . . . [must have] the same access to 
funds and resources”113 and the state could provide the funds necessary to ensure a 
fair judicial process that comported with constitutional guarantees. Moreover, 
judges could decide cases on their merits rather than based on external pressures 
from other branches of government. 
To alleviate the potential overload on district court judges, the council 
recommended elevating existing justices of the peace to the position of District 
Magistrate.114 The magistrates would serve below the district judges, and would be 
nominated by commission and retained by election.115 The council recommended 
that magistrates be attorneys, except in some “less-populated” areas “where there 
are few, if any attorneys.”116 At a minimum, the council felt like the magistrates 
should be United States citizens, should pass a qualifying examination, take yearly 
legal education courses, and have relevant age and experience.117 The council also 
recommended that all judges statewide have a legal education.118 
In response to the council report and several direct legal challenges to the 
justice courts,119 Utah took the dramatic step of creating a statewide system of 
                                                 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 19. 
110 Id. at 45; see also Comment, Circuit Court Plan Can Upgrade Utah Justice, 
DESERET NEWS, Dec. 3, 1976, at A5 (“JPs still serve a useful purpose in outlying rural 
areas with small populations. Their retention along the Wasatch Front, however, is an 
anomaly.”). 
111 See UTAH LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, supra note 97, at 12. 
112 See id. at 13. 
113 Id. at 45. 
114 Id. at 38–39; see also Circuit Court a Step Closer, DESERET NEWS, Dec. 2, 1976, 
at B1 (noting the creation of circuit courts would “ease the . . . burden on district courts, 
allowing them more time for more serious cases”). 
115 See UTAH LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, supra note 97, at 39. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. Although the council recommended all judges have legal training, it left room 
for the committee to allow nonlegally trained judges in remote areas. Id. 
119 See infra Part II. 
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circuit courts, designed largely to replace its justice courts.120 In this system, circuit 
courts were given jurisdiction to hear misdemeanor cases, as well as the authority 
to hear felony matters up until bind-over to the district court. For felonies, all 
proceedings up to and including preliminary hearings were conducted in the circuit 
courts. The circuit court’s proceedings were recorded.121 Trials de novo were 
eliminated, since the circuit court’s proceedings would be recorded. All judges 
were to be legally trained and were paid out of state funds at the rate of 90% of the 
salary of a district court judge.122 
In the early 1990s the circuit court system was eliminated and replaced with a 
commissioner system; circuit court judges were moved to district court 
positions.123 The commissioners essentially exercised all of the powers of the 
former circuit court judges, but were not appointed according to Utah’s 
constitutional requirements.124 The lack of compliance with the constitution 
ultimately proved to be the downfall of the commissioner system. In Salt Lake City 
v. Ohms, the Utah Supreme Court declared the commissioner system 
unconstitutional because the commissioners exercised judicial authority without 
undergoing proper judicial selection.125 
The elimination of the commissioner system created a judicial void across 
Salt Lake County.126 District Courts were located in Sandy, West Jordan, Murray, 
West Valley, and Salt Lake City. All criminal offenses filed in Salt Lake County 
                                                 
120 See Circuit Court a Step Closer, supra note 114; Comment, supra note 110; 
Robert D. Mullins, 33 Circuit Court Judges Take Oaths July 1, DESERET NEWS, June 16, 
1978, at B1; Joseph T. Liddell, 1st Criminal Case in New Circuit Court, DESERET NEWS, 
July 7, 1978, at A14 (“The case marks the transition from a city to circuit court system, 
which is administered by the state.”); Jan Thompson, Former Justice Official Seeks to 
Unify Utah’s Court System, DESERET NEWS, Aug. 30, 1991, at B3 (referring to only three 
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123 Ohms, 881 P.2d at 849 (discussing the use of circuit courts, district courts, courts 
of appeals, and juvenile courts); Utah Court System, UTAH ST. ARCHIVES & RECS. SERVICE 
(June 29, 2010), http://archives.utah.gov/research/guides/courts-system.htm. 
124 Ohms, 881 P.2d at 850–53 (noting state law requires a judicial nominating 
commission and other procedures). 
125 Id. at 850–55; see also State v. Taysom, 886 P.2d 513, 513 (Utah 1994) (reversing 
conviction for the same reason). 
126 Stephen Hunt, Court Reversal Doesn’t Stop the Questions: Are Utah Justices Just 
Righting a Wrong or Wronging Rights? Does New Ruling Right a Wrong or Wrong 
Rights?, SALT LAKE TRIB., Aug. 20, 1994, at A1. 
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had to be filed in these locations (except for infractions and Class B and C 
misdemeanors committed in unincorporated Salt Lake County, which continued to 
be filed with the Salt Lake County Justice Court). The result was “chaotic.” In this 
void municipal justice courts began to re-emerge in Utah and it quickly returned to 
the situation prior to circuit court movement.127 
Today, justice courts dot Utah’s legal (and physical) landscape. These courts 
experience the same problems and concerns of other states’ municipal courts. 
Recognizing these problems, Utah engaged in a meaningful attempt to restructure 
its courts, but ultimately fell back to a system with the same problems as before. 
There are currently over one hundred municipal courts in the state which, like their 
predecessors, continue to create problems. 
 
II.  INEXORABLE CONSTITUTIONAL, STRUCTURAL,  
AND PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS IN UTAH’S JUSTICE COURTS 
 
Utah’s justice courts are plagued by several inherent constitutional, structural, 
and procedural problems. The courts raise a number of separation of powers issues 
because justices of the peace act as members of the executive branch. The justice 
courts are also constitutionally problematic, since they retain revenue generation 
(instead of justice) as a primary interest, and place far too much authority and 
judicial power in the hands of judges who are inadequately trained. Furthermore, 
the justice courts inefficiently and unnecessarily duplicate services. Together, the 
problems undermine the legitimacy of the courts themselves as well as the greater 
justice system, and lend strong support for the remedial actions discussed below. 
 
A.  Utah’s Justice Courts Violate Separation of Powers 
 
Utah’s justice courts raise a number of separation of powers problems. First, 
the justice courts are structured so that judges are executive officers of 
municipalities and remain under the direct supervision of those cities in violation 
of the Utah constitution. Second, justice courts allow prosecutors to exercise 
legislative powers to create new offenses within the justice court’s jurisdiction. 
 
1.  Title 10 of the Utah Municipal Code Does Not Provide for the Creation 
of a Judicial Body in Municipalities 
 
The Utah State Legislature created the primary separation of powers problem 
that plagues Utah’s justice courts; it involves the role justice court judges must 
                                                 
127 Jay Baltezore, S.L. Council OKs City-Run Courts for Misdemeanors, SALT LAKE 
TRIB., June 2, 1995, at B3. The city claimed state-run courts gave “misdemeanor cases 
short shrift.” Id.; see also Bountiful Will Replace Circuit Court in 1994, SALT LAKE TRIB., 
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take in the organization of the municipality. Utah’s constitution provides that 
“[t]he judicial power of the state shall be vested in a Supreme Court, in a trial court 
of general jurisdiction known as the district court, and in such other courts as the 
Legislature by statute may establish.”128  
The term “judicial power . . . is generally understood to be the power to hear 
and determine controversies between adverse parties and questions in litigation.”129 
Because these powers are core to the judicial branch,130 “no person charged with 
the exercise of powers properly belonging to [the Legislative or Executive 
branches of government]” may exercise these powers.131 Only members of the 
judicial branch of government may “enter final judgments and orders or impose 
sentence.”132  
The statutory creation of justice courts, authorized by article VIII, section 1 of 
the Utah Constitution, is found in title 78A, chapter 7, of the Utah Code. Under 
these statutes, the powers to establish, oversee, maintain, and dissolve a justice 
court are firmly vested with the governing body of a municipality.133 Under Utah 
law, a municipality desiring to create a justice court must file a written declaration 
with the Judicial Council.134 Following such a request, and after a review of 
compliance with operating standards “established by statute and the Judicial 
Council,” the Judicial Council is required to certify the creation of the court.135  
Although title 78A, chapter 7, clearly indicates how a justice court is to be 
created, it is silent as to what position justice courts are to occupy in the 
organizational structure of the municipality. This silence raises separation of 
powers concerns. 
Utah’s Constitution prohibits members of separate branches from exercising 
the powers belonging to another branch.136 The problem comes from the fact that 
Utah statutes treat municipalities as “political subdivisions of the state of Utah,” 
which operate under a legislative and executive body.137 City councils hold 
municipal legislative power, while mayors hold executive power.138 
While Utah law provides for judicial bodies at the state level (Supreme Court, 
Court of Appeals, District Court, and Juvenile Court), there is no provision for 
judicial bodies to exist at the municipal level. Justice courts, created and operated 
by municipalities, do so as a member of the executive or legislative branch. This is 
not by choice, but by necessity, because Utah law does not provide for another 
place for justice courts to operate. 
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130 Ohms, 881 P.2d at 848. 
131 UTAH CONST. art. V, § 1. 
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Utah’s Supreme Court has articulated a three-part test to determine whether a 
law violates separation of powers mandated by the Utah Constitution. 
 
First, are the [actors] in question “charged with the exercise of powers 
properly belonging to” one of the three branches of government? Second, 
is the function that the statute has given the [actors] one “appertaining 
to” another branch of government? The third and final step in the 
analysis asks: if the answer to both of the above questions is “yes,” does 
the constitution “expressly” direct or permit exercise of the otherwise 
forbidden function? If not, article V, section 1 is transgressed.139 
 
Utah’s justice courts do not pass this three-part test. 
First, because of Title 10’s limitations, justice courts must operate under the 
supervision of the executive or legislative branch of the municipality.140 As 
organized, Utah justice courts essentially operate as an administrative agency. 
Second, title 78A, chapter 7, of the Utah Code gives justice court judges the 
“same authority regarding matters within their jurisdiction as judges of courts of 
record.”141 These powers include the ability to hear and determine controversies 
between adverse parties and questions in litigation,142 and to “enter final judgments 
and orders or impose sentence.”143 These functions are the core powers of the 
judicial branch. 
Third, article V, section 1 of the Utah Constitution, states that “[t]he powers 
of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into three distinct 
departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and no person 
charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these 
departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining to either of the others           
. . .”144 
In other words, the constitution does not expressly permit or direct the 
exercise of the core judicial powers to an administrative agency. But since this is 
the only way justice courts may be operated, unless the municipality in question 
desires to operate outside of Title 10, “article V, section 1 is transgressed.”145 
 
2.  Amending to Infractions 
 
The second separation of powers problem occurs when justice courts allow 
prosecutors to amend misdemeanor charges to crimes that have not been enacted 
by the Utah Legislature. Specifically, prosecutors improperly exercise legislative 
duties by changing misdemeanor crimes to infractions, and judges allow this to 
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occur. For example, Utah’s legislature defines assault as a Class B 
misdemeanor.146 A person convicted of a Class B misdemeanor may serve up to 
six months in jail.147 Often, prosecutors in justice court amend misdemeanor 
assault charges to infractions—with the justice court judge’s consent—before trial. 
It is important to note that the crime of assault, as an infraction, does not exist in 
the Utah Code. Thus, prosecutors re-define (or tamper with) the possible 
punishments and due process procedures (meaning right to a jury trial) for crimes 
that have been clearly outlined by the Utah Legislature. In doing so, members of 
the executive and judicial branch impermissibly over-step the duties that the 
United States and Utah Constitutions specifically reserve for the legislative branch 
of government, resulting in a clear separation of powers problem. 
At first glance, it may appear that justice court defendants benefit from 
reducing their misdemeanor charges to infractions. After all, an infraction 
conviction carries no possible risk of incarceration and a maximum fine of $750.148 
Thus, it might be argued that in this instance, one should overlook the separation 
of powers problem. However, reducing misdemeanor charges to infractions places 
enormous burdens on defendants that far outweigh any benefits defendants gain 
from the reduction in offense. Once prosecutors amend the charges to infractions, 
justice court defendants lose their right to a jury trial, depriving defendants of this 
fundamental protection. 
An additional negative consequence of amending charges to infractions is the 
deprivation of appointed counsel, since the right applies only to cases in which 
incarceration is a possibility. Most justice court defendants do not hire an attorney 
because costs of representation are greater than the maximum fine imposed for an 
infraction.149 Ultimately, many justice court defendants proceed ill equipped to 
battle a legally-trained prosecutor. Thus, amendment to infractions 
disproportionately affects indigent defendants, who shoulder the costs of hiring 
counsel when the right to counsel does not apply.150 
Compounding this problem, a guilty verdict may carry significant collateral 
consequences, such as deportation, loss of student loans, loss of driving privileges, 
or sentencing enhancements.151 Defendants may be ordered to undergo treatment, 
                                                 
146 See § 76-5-102. Note that it is a Class B misdemeanor if the assault is “an attempt, 
with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to another; [or] a threat, accompanied 
by a show of immediate force or violence, to do bodily injury to another; [or] an act, 
committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes bodily injury to another.” It is a 
Class A misdemeanor if “the person causes substantial bodily injury to another; [or] the 
victim is pregnant and the person has knowledge of the pregnancy.” Id. 
147 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-204 (West 2011). 
148 Id. §§ 76-3-205, -301. 
149 See Eric S. Peterson, Nickeled and Dimed: Utah’s Justice Courts Exact Their 
Pound of Flesh, SALT LAKE CITY WKLY., May 27, 2010 (cover story). 
150 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343–44 (1963) (establishing the right to 
counsel guarantees state-provided counsel to indigent defendants). 
151 See Sam Newton, Justice Court Appeals: The Good, the Bad, and the Unintended, 
UTAH B.J., Jan.–Feb. 2005, at 22, 25. 
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costing them thousands of dollars.152 If the defendant does not comply with these 
requirements and cannot afford the classes, he could be incarcerated for 
contempt.153 Even though the initial infraction charge did not carry the risk of 
incarceration as a penalty, noncompliance with justice court orders on an infraction 
could result in a justice court defendant finding himself in jail. 
In sum, justice court defendants suffer greatly when prosecutors act as 
legislators by amending criminal misdemeanor charges to infractions. The right to 
a jury trial and appointed counsel are definite and immediate losses that result from 
prosecutors’ actions. But defendants also suffer significant collateral consequences 
once convicted of infractions in justice court. 
Problems with separation of powers do not exist only in the abstract, they 
have been raised in Utah’s courts as well. In West Jordan City v. Goodman,154 the 
defendant alleged that justice courts violated separation of powers because they 
were “employed and controlled by the municipalities that benefit from the fines 
they levy.”155 The Utah Supreme Court dismissed this argument as inadequately 
briefed, based on the defendant’s “scant evidence” and failure to address the 
relevant test for separation of powers violations.156 However, though this case was 
inadequately briefed, the court indicated a willingness to address separation of 
powers arguments in the future.157 
In a second separation of powers challenge to the justice courts, Hyde Park 
City v. Davis,158 the Utah Court of Appeals dismissed the case for inadequate 
briefing.159 While the defendant made a similar argument to that in Goodman, he 
failed to argue or brief the separation of powers test. 
In Ogden City v. Fernandez,160 the defendant challenged an amendment of his 
misdemeanor domestic violence charges to infractions by a prosecutor two days 
                                                 
152 See Peterson, supra note 149. 
153 See id. 
154 135 P.3d 874 (Utah 2006). 
155 Id. at 876–77. 
156 Id. at 877, 883. The court declined to use an amicus curiae brief submitted by the 
Utah Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers to salvage defendant’s arguments. Id. at 
883. 
157 Id. at 883 (“[W]e are not foreclosing future challenges to the validity of the justice 
court scheme, and in fact, we encourage the legislature to give serious consideration to 
some of the arguments raised in the amicus brief. It is theoretically possible that a justice 
court judge may be unable to exercise his judicial functions with the necessary impartiality 
because of pressure to generate revenue for his municipal employer or that a municipal 
government may exercise such control over its justice court that it violates fundamental 
principles of separation of powers. But to prevail on such claims, a defendant would need 
to support them with specific evidence and cogent legal argument.”) (internal citations 
omitted). 
158 2009 UT App 39 U. 
159 Id. at *3; see also Brief of Appellant, Davis, 2009 UT App 39 U (No. 20080055-
CA), 2008 WL 6653935 at *29–52 (making the separation of powers argument). 
160 2006 UT App 279 U. 
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before trial.161 The trial court denied the defendant’s motion for a jury trial and 
subsequently convicted him.162 On appeal, the defendant argued that provisions 
removing his right to a jury trial on infractions violated the Utah Constitution.163 
The Utah Court of Appeals disagreed, reasoning that defendants do not have a 
right to a jury trial if the offense carries no possibility of incarceration.164 
Following the suggestion of the Utah Supreme Court, in 2009 the legislature 
addressed the separation of powers issue by changing justice court judges’ 
appointment and retention process. Today, municipal leaders may no longer hire 
justice court judges. Instead, justice court nominating commissions appoint justice 
court judges, which must also be ratified by the local legislative body.165 Under the 
new provision, justice court judges are appointed for six-year terms and are 
retained by popular election.166 The legislature also removed the city or county 
executive’s ability to fire a judge for “good cause.”167 
 
B.  Double Jeopardy, Due Process, and Equal Protection 
 
Independent of the problems with separation of powers, Utah’s justice courts 
have been constitutionally challenged on double jeopardy, due process, and equal 
protection grounds. In Bernat v. Allphin,168 the defendants challenged the justice 
court appellate requirement that defendants obtain a certificate of probable cause to 
stay a justice court sentence.169 A stay order may be issued by either a justice or a 
district court.170 To obtain a stay, a defendant must submit “a memorandum of 
law” that “raise[s] a substantial question of law . . . reasonably likely to result in 
                                                 
161 Id. at *1 & n.1. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. at *3 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-1-6(2)(e) (LexisNexis 2003) and UTAH R. 
CRIM. P. 17(d)). Defendant alleged a violation of Article I, Section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution. Id. 
164 Id. at *4–5 (citing W. Valley City v. McDonald, 948 P.2d 371 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997)). The court also dismissed the State constitutional argument as inadequately briefed. 
Id. at *3. 
165 See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-7-202(2)(d) (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2011). Also, 
this new process of appointing justice court judges is still different from the means by 
which district court judges are appointed. See UTAH CONST. art. VII, § 8, cl.1–3. District 
court judges are first nominated by the Governor and then confirmed by a majority of the 
Utah State Senate. Id. 
166 See § 78A-7-203. 
167 See Justice Court Amendments, S.B. 72, 2008 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2008) (repealing 
and reenacting UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-5-134(5)) (renumbered as § 78A-7-202). 
168 Bernat v. Allphin, 106 P.3d 707 (Utah 2005). 
169 Id. at 709. Since the action in Bernat was filed, but before the case was decided, 
Utah Rule of Judicial Administration 4-608 has been repealed and replaced by the 
procedures outlined the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id. at 709 n.2. Rule 38 
addresses “Appeals from justice court to district court” and Rule 27A addresses “Stays 
pending appeal from a court not of record.” UTAH R. CRIM. P. 27A, 38. 
170 See Bernat, 106 P.3d at 710. 
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reversal.”171 If the court agrees and finds that the appeal “is not being taken for the 
purpose of delay,” then a certificate of probable cause may issue.172 The 
defendants argued this process “violate[d] double jeopardy, due process, and equal 
protection,” each with their own rationales.173 
The defendants argued that the stay process violated double jeopardy because 
it did not automatically “wipe the slate clean” and void the justice court judgment 
while the trial de novo was pending in the district court.174 Instead, the process 
placed the defendant in district court having been “convicted of the exact offense 
he will be tried for a second time.”175 
The Utah Supreme Court dismissed the defendants’ double jeopardy argument 
for three primary reasons.176 First, the court reasoned that the defendant, not the 
state, chooses to appeal.177 Thus, the State did not pursue a second prosecution for 
the same offense. Second, when they appeal de novo, defendants cannot receive 
simultaneous or multiple punishments for the same offense.178 Finally, a 
defendant’s jeopardy never terminates and restarts during the process—in essence, 
he remains in “continuing jeopardy” during the appeal.179 
The defendants claimed the trial de novo process violated due process because 
it was “extremely burdensome” and “chill[ed] a justice court defendant’s right to 
appeal.”180 The Utah Supreme Court, however, rejected this argument, reasoning 
that the defendants were overly focused on “perceived inadequacies relating to a 
defendant’s ability to obtain a stay of his or her conviction, not on a defendant’s 
ability to effectively appeal his or her conviction.”181 In essence, justice court 
defendants had an absolute right to an appeal, so long as they properly filed a 
notice within the thirty-day requirement.182 The mere fact that a defendant might 
experience difficulties obtaining a stay of his sentence was “wholly separate from 
and [had] no impact on a defendant’s ability to appeal his or her conviction.”183 
                                                 
171 Id. (quoting UTAH R. CRIM. P. 27(d)(2) (2005) (rewritten 2009)). 
172 Id. (quoting UTAH R. CRIM. P. 27(f) (2005) (rewritten 2009)). 
173 Id. at 710. 
174 Id. at 711. 
175 Id. 
176 See id. at 711–16. 
177 See id. at 714–15. 
178 See id. at 715 (explaining that the protections against double jeopardy are 
“intended ‘to prevent a defendant from being subjected to multiple punishments for the 
same offense[,]’” but that “[n]one of these policy considerations is implicated under Utah’s 
system. . . . [T]here is no concern that a defendant could receive multiple punishments in 
both a justice court and a district court for the same offense.” (quoting Justices of Bos. 
Mun. Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 307 (1984))). 
179 See id. at 713–14, 716. 
180 Id. at 716. 
181 Id. at 716–17. 
182 See id. at 710 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-5-120(1) (2002)). 
183 Id. at 717 (citing UTAH R. JUD. ADMIN. 4-608(4)). The Utah Supreme Court 
refused to address other due process concerns raised by defendants because these issues 
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The defendants also argued that the appeal process violated equal protection 
“because a justice court defendant maintains a guilty status pending a trial de novo, 
[and therefore] a justice court defendant is treated differently than a defendant who 
has obtained a new trial after successfully reversing his or her sentence on 
appeal.”184 The Utah Supreme Court, however, did not find an equal protection 
violation, reasoning that a justice court defendant is more like a district court 
defendant who first appeals, rather than a district court defendant who obtains a 
new trial on appeal.185 Justice court defendants receive more favorable treatment 
than traditional district court appellants, since they get a “second opportunity to 
relitigate the facts relating to his or her guilt or innocence after having had the 
advantage of learning about the prosecution’s case during the first trial.”186 
Despite rejecting all three of the defendants’ arguments, the court stopped 
short of validating Utah’s justice court system. Specifically, the court noted that a 
sentence imposed by a nonlawyer judge “could conceivably raise due process 
concerns”—but that this issue was not properly raised.187 
 
C.  Justice Courts Continue to Focus on Revenue-Generation 
 
Justice courts continue to operate under pressure to generate money for their 
municipalities or counties. In 2007, Utah’s justice courts generated over $72 
million dollars in revenue and were projected to bring in $84 million in 2008.188 In 
2010, not one justice court in the state lost money, despite the severe economic 
difficulties nationwide.189 Justice courts dispose of 70 percent of all cases filed in 
Utah’s courts, and of those disposed cases, 82 percent involve traffic offenses, 
which constitute the type of offense that raises the serious concern that cases are 
filed and adjudicated in order for municipalities to generate revenue.190 
According to Chief Justice Christine M. Durham, a “growing public 
perception” exists “that justice courts are vehicles for generating revenue” which 
                                                 
were inadequately briefed or involved a scenario not present in the consolidated cases 
brought before the Court. Id. at 717. 
184 Id. at 717. 
185 Id. at 717–18. 
186 Id. at 718. 
187 Id. at 717 n.13 (citing North v. Russell, 427 U.S. 328 (1976)). 
188 Christine M. Durham, Chief Justice, Utah Supreme Court, Address at the 2008 
State of the Judiciary 8 (Jan. 21, 2008), available at http://www.utcourts.gov/ 
resources/reports/statejudiciary/2008-StateOfTheJudiciary.pdf. 
189 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS JUSTICE COURT REVENUE REPORT FY2010 
(Jan. 11, 2011). 
190 Durham, supra note 188, at 8; Utah Administrative Office of the Courts, Utah 
Justice Courts Cases Filed and Disposed July 1, 2008–June 30, 2009 (FY09), 
UTCOURTS.GOV (Sept. 18, 2009), http://www.utcourts.gov/stats/files/2009FY/justice/0-
Statewide.pdf (reporting that justice courts disposed of 518,330 traffic cases in the 2009 
fiscal year). 
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she explained should “never [be] a proper function for courts as institutions.”191 
She continued, expressing a strong concern about the justice courts: 
 
[W]e want the public to perceive that their courts are fair and impartial. 
Without this perception, there cannot exist an essential element of our 
form of government — public trust and confidence in the judicial branch 
. . . . There is, in my view, no more pressing problem of public 
perception regarding Utah’s court system than the justice courts.192 
 
Chief Justice Durham implored legislative action. “I urge you to seize this 
opportunity to reform a system in need of attention and to enhance the public’s 
confidence in these courts.”193  
The revenue generation concern is best illustrated by justice court judges’ 
continued dependence on their municipalities.194 Utah law authorizes a city to 
create a justice court, so long as the municipality funds the costs of all court 
personnel and facilities.195 In fact, one-half of the revenue from all fines collected 
is to be given to the municipality that hosts the court and the other half is to be 
given to the municipality who provides the prosecuting agency.196 Judges remain 
city officers, pressured to “make ends meet” for their city. For example, in 2003 
the Chief Administrative Officer of Salt Lake City praised city judges for their 
comparatively high conviction rate as compared to district courts, and then noted 
the revenue collected from the city’s traffic efforts.197 
In other words, judges may be pressured to provide revenue for their cities. A 
failure to make money may subject the judge to repercussions, such as lack of 
administrative support. In 2004, Salt Lake County’s Criminal Justice Advisory 
Council commissioned a study by the Institute for Law and Policy Planning to 
examine overcrowding in its jail (the Kalmanoff Study).198 The Institute pointed 
out that the “harshest criticism” against justice courts “is that they were established 
                                                 
191 Durham, supra note 188, at 8. 
192 Id. at 7. 
193 Id. at 10. 
194 See Mike Martinez, Utah’s Justice Court System, a Legal Charade, 22 UTAH B.J., 
Mar.-April 2009, at 27, 31. 
195 See id. at 27 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-7-101 to -301 (LexisNexis 2010)). 
196 UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-7-120(1) (LexisNexis 2008). 
197 Martinez, supra note 194, at 27 (“In an April 30, 2003 memorandum, the Chief 
Administrative Officer of Salt Lake City praised city judges for convicting 97 percent of all 
traffic defendants. This, he wrote, was a great improvement over the paltry 66 percent 
conviction rate by Third District Court Judges, who decided Salt Lake traffic cases prior to 
the city implementing its own justice system. The majority of the memorandum discusses 
additional revenue collected through the higher conviction rates.” (citations omitted)). 
198 INST. FOR LAW AND POLICY PLANNING, SALT LAKE COUNTY CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM ASSESSMENT (2004) [hereinafter KALMANOFF STUDY], http://cjac.slco.org/ 
resources/SaltLakeCJSAfinal.pdf. 
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as a revenue stream for cities.”199 Cities may “become dependent on the money 
generated through enforcement,” the study said, which could pressure judges to 
“be overly aggressive as a way to meet financial expectations and demands.”200 
The study further found that in Salt Lake County, judges and city administrators 
“freely admit that they believe the justice courts are a source of significant revenue 
for their cities.”201 Increased caseloads helped cities, which viewed the “ultimate” 
case as “a traffic citation in which the cited person does not contest the citation and 
mails in his/her payment” since “there is little overhead in such offense 
transactions but instead, maximum revenue over expense.”202 Cities, Kalmanoff 
found, “universally . . . view the [justice] courts as a prime revenue source worthy 
of protection and expansion.”203 
The Utah Supreme Court’s Nehring Commission, headed by Justice Ronald 
Nehring, found similar problems, and provided several proposals and legislative 
recommendations.204 To combat the concern that judges were being pressured to 
generate revenue, the Nehring Commission proposed “[u]ncoupl[ing] the money 
and the judge” and recommended justice court judges’ salaries be paid by the state 
according to a fixed schedule.205 A percentage of justice court fines would be 
diverted to the state under this system, while the municipality would remain 
obligated to pay its court support expenses.206  
The legislature declined to adopt this proposal, but did adopt some of the 
smaller other changes proposed by the Nehring Commission in the 2008 legislative 
session.207 Among the proposals adopted was the creation of a new appointment 
and retention plan for justice court judges that required judges be appointed by a 
county-wide judicial selection committee and retained by a county-wide retention 
election every six years.208 Additionally, the legislation mandated that 
municipalities or counties pay their justice court judges at a rate of no less than 50 
percent and no more than 90 percent of the salary of a district court judge.209 
                                                 
199 Id. at 3.8. The study also noted the growth in justice courts “[was] is in large part 
due to a need for increased revenue . . . .” Id. at 6.5. 
200 Id. at 3.8. 
201 Id. at 6.11. 
202 Id. 
203 Id. 
204 JUDICIAL COUNCIL, JUSTICE COURT STUDY COMM., INTERIM PROGRESS REPORT 6 
(2008) [hereinafter Nehring Commission] (on file with author). 
205 Id. at 10, 16. 
206 Id. 
207 See Justice Court Amendments, S.B. 72, 2008 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2008). 
208 S.B. 72, 2008 Gen. Sess. (repealing and reenacting UTAH CODE ANN § 78-5-134 
(LexisNexis 2008), which was subsequently repealed and renumbered as UTAH CODE ANN 
§ 78A-7-202 (LexisNexis 2008)). 
209 Id. (repealing and reenacting UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-5-128 (LexisNexis 2008), 
which was subsequently repealed and renamed as UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-7-206 
(LexisNexis 2008)). 
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The bill solved some, but far from all, of the previous concerns about ties to 
revenue generation. If the judge could not be hired or fired by the municipality, 
then she would have no incentive to raise money for the justice court, since the 
voters (as opposed to municipal administrators) would be unlikely to remove a 
judge from office for a failure to raise revenue. However, the statute failed to 
address some key concerns. Changing the hiring and firing procedure does not 
necessarily alleviate concerns of revenue generation. The problem results in the 
fundamental nature of justice courts. If the court exists to collect revenue for the 
municipality, then the judicial hiring and firing procedure fails to address the 
underlying cause of the problem. Granted, eliminating the municipality’s ability to 
fire might affect the “perception . . . of dominance that elected city officials have 
over the judiciary they created”210 but it fails to address the reality that justice 
courts are largely revenue-driven, revenue-generating machines. This is because 
justice court judges are not fully independent judicial officers, even after the 
amendments. 
Moneymaking continues to be a problem because structural revenue 
generating pressures still exist. Justice court judges remain administrative officers 
in their cities. The Utah Code requires a justice court judge to comply with county 
or municipal rules related to “personnel, budgets and other administrative 
functions.”211 “Failure by the judge to comply with applicable administrative 
county or municipal rules and regulations may be referred, by the county executive 
or municipal legislative body, to the state Justice Court Administrator” which shall 
be considered as part of the judge’s performance evaluation.212 Under the 2008 
revision, a justice court judge may no longer be dismissed for a failure to comply 
with the city’s budgetary requirements. However, her performance evaluation may 
be adversely impacted if she is not generating revenue. The performance 
evaluation goes to the public at large in a retention election. Thus, though reforms 
have separated the explicit revenue generating pressure and incentive structure, 
revenue generation remains a pressure at an administrative level through 
performance evaluations.213 
These fiscal goals are not speculative. For example, Salt Lake City, the largest 
city in the state, claimed in fiscal year 2009–2010 that its justice court would 
generate additional revenues through parking and traffic tickets, partially because 
                                                 
210 KALMANOFF STUDY, supra note 198, at 6.10. 
211 UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-7-210(1) (LexisNexis 2008). 
212 Id. § 78A-7-210(2) to -210(3). 
213 In March 2012, the Utah Legislature passed another piece of legislation, allowing 
the Judicial Council to supervise all municipal justice courts. Justice Court Amendments, 
2012 Utah Laws, Ch. 205 (S.B. 200) (enacting Utah Code Ann. § 78A-7-103 (West 2009 & 
Supp. 2012) (effective May 8, 2012)). The bill requires justice courts record their 
proceedings, have sufficient prosecutors and defense attorneys, court security, courtroom 
space, and current copies of the Utah Code. Id. The Judicial Council may decline to 
recertify a justice court that fails to comply with these requirements. Utah Code Ann. § 
78A-7-103(1)(b)(ii). Unfortunately, the bill did little to address issues of revenue 
generation. 
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traffic tickets had increased 31 percent from the prior year.214 The city proposed 
increasing fees for traffic school, parking tickets late fees, traffic pleas in abeyance 
and small claims, which would result in nearly $500,000 of additional revenue.215 
This illustrates the fiscal issues justice courts face: when city budgets are 
tight, traffic tickets and the work of justice courts can be used to generate 
additional revenue for the city. In Salt Lake City, increasing fee totals and the 
number of parking tickets and/or fines would result in significantly increased 
revenue for the municipality. 
The United States Supreme Court has addressed similar concerns, noting that 
judges who have a “direct pecuniary interest in the outcome” of the case or who 
are faced with “a possible temptation” to abandon their neutral role as judge would 
not fill the role mandated by due process.216 Similar to Utah’s justice court judges, 
the Supreme Court held that an executive officer judge could not independently 
exercise his judicial role given his executive ties to revenue generation: “the 
mayor’s executive responsibilities for village finances may make him partisan to 
maintain the high level of contribution from the mayor’s court.”217 
While the Utah legislature and judiciary have made significant progress by 
modifying the hiring and firing procedure of justice court judges, the problem 
remains that cities depend on justice courts for revenue-generation. A judge’s 
“dependence on fees tends powerfully to undermine his integrity.”218 The Utah 
Supreme Court has made clear that justice court judges must not have financial 
motivations for their decisions. Yet Utah’s justice court judges may have just such 
an incentive because they continue to be required to maintain some control of the 
city’s budgets and remain administrative officers in their respective cities. While 
justice court judges have some additional degree of independence (because it is 
now more difficult to hire and fire them), they continue to have financial incentives 
to keep their courts afloat. Until that fundamental conflict changes significantly, 
one cannot expect to see concerns about impartiality of the justice courts abated. 
 
D.  The Confusion Surrounding De Novo Appeal  
 
Significant uncertainty surrounds the appeal process from the justice courts. 
In Utah, once a guilty determination is made, a justice court defendant is entitled to 
a trial de novo appeal to the District Court.219 However, there is some debate about 
                                                 
214 SALT LAKE CITY DEP’T OF ADMIN. SERVS., CAPITAL AND OPERATING BUDGET 
FISCAL YEAR 2009–10, at D-33 (2009), available at http://www.slcgov.com/ 
finance/2010budget/budgetbook10.pdf. 
215 See id. at B-5, D-33, D-34. 
216 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532, 535 (1927). The Supreme Court later declined 
to extend this holding to a mayor-justice of the peace whose salary was not dependent on 
convictions. Dugan v. Ohio, 277 U.S. 61, 63 (1928). 
217 Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60–62 (1972). 
218 Smith, supra note 45, at 121. 
219 See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-7-118 (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2011); see also 
UTAH R. CRIM. P. 38(b). The District Court procedures that are to be followed when a 
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the nature of the de novo appeal under Utah law. Under one perspective, a 
defendant who files an appeal literally begins with a clean slate in the district court 
with no deference given to the justice court ruling.220 The prior justice court’s 
judgment is nullified and it is as if all prior proceedings never occurred.221 Also 
under this interpretation, a defendant’s presumption of innocence reattaches.222  
The other, less robust, perspective sees the justice court judgment as valid, 
“and the defendant is merely entitled to an appeal which takes the form of a retrial 
in the district court, after which the justice court judgment is replaced.”223 Instead 
of returning the presumption of innocence to the defendant upon a trial de novo 
appeal, merit is given to the justice court’s determinations, and most importantly to 
determinations regarding guilt. 
Utah’s case law supports the first view—that the trial de novo process restarts 
the case anew and returns a defendant’s presumption of innocence.224 In State v. 
Hinson,225 the Utah Court of Appeals stated, “because the justice court is not a 
court of record, the ‘appeal’ does not involve a review of the justice court 
proceedings.”226 Thus, “[t]he district court neither reverses nor affirms the 
judgment of the justice court, but renders a new, distinct, and independent 
judgment.”227 In Dean v. Henriod,228 the Utah Court of Appeals stated that in a trial 
de novo appeal, the defendant “essentially get[s] a fresh start” and the case is “tried 
in the district court as if it originated there.”229 Thus, in a trial de novo appeal, “the 
district court is ‘not acting in a typical appellate capacity.’”230 The Utah Supreme 
Court held that although de novo review is “a form of appellate review,” the state 
must prove guilt “as it would had the case originated there,” and that the justice 
court’s proceeding “plays no part in the trial de novo, except that a district court is 
prohibited from imposing a harsher sentence than that imposed by the justice 
court.”231  
                                                 
justice court defendant exercises his trial de novo appeal rights are found in Rule 38(e) of 
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. See UTAH R. CRIM. P. 38(e). Once in the district 
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It could be complained that allowing a clean state on appeal actually 
advantages justice court defendants because they get “two bites at the apple” to 
avoid conviction. A strong notion of de novo rights, however, does not give justice 
court defendants an undue advantage over district court defendants; rather, this 
view attempts to equalize the playing field. Justice courts are not courts of record. 
With no official court record, a justice court defendant cannot use a witness’s prior 
statement against the witness at the second trial, but also cannot expose judicial 
misconduct that occurs. Therefore, a defendant cannot safeguard the procedural 
inadequacies that occur in those courts. Thus, justice court defendants should 
receive two bites at the proverbial apple, because their first bite may well be into a 
rotten apple. 
Ultimately, a strong de novo right is preferable to a watered-down right 
precisely because district court defendants have a more robust appellate right 
compared to justice court defendants. District court defendants have an automatic 
right to appeal their case to a court of appeals. While the facts of any case are not 
retried in the appellate court, district court defendants are entitled to a panel of 
three judges who will review a transcript of the entire proceedings conducted at the 
trial level. Because district court proceedings are courts of record, appellate judges 
can scour the entire trial court proceeding to ensure that the defendant received a 
fair trial. Justice court defendants do not get the opportunity to have the record 
reviewed on appeal. Thus, the strong de novo position partially overcomes the 
procedural inadequacies faced by justice court defendants. However, even a strong 
concept of trial de novo may fail to provide the justice court defendant with the 
appellate rights equal to a district court defendant due to initial justice court 
procedural inadequacies, namely the inability to appeal the decision beyond the 
district court, decisions rendered by a nonlawyer judge, lack of a written record to 
review at the district court level, and reduced access to appointed counsel. 
 
                                                 
appeal. Id. at 716 (“Because Utah justice courts are not ‘courts of record,’ it is not only 
constitutionally permissible to allow a defendant the opportunity to relitigate his or her case 
anew, but practically and reasonably sound.”). 
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E.  Problem of the Appellate Stay Procedure 
 
Until 2012, Utah had no automatic provision for vacating sentences imposed 
by justice courts.232 Before 2012, Rule 27A(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure 
came closest to requiring an automatic stay—it requires justice court judges to stay 
sentences if the incarceration period was for less than thirty days.233 But the rule 
also required justice court defendants sentenced to periods of incarceration over 
thirty days to petition the justice court and to obtain a stay from that court and then 
deal with myriad procedures to perfect the stay process.234 The rule allowed justice 
court judges to refuse to stay sentences if they found that the defendant posed an 
identifiable risk to the safety to others or the community, or that there was a lack of 
legal basis for the appeal.235 
Rule 27A created several problems. The first problem is that the procedures 
contradicted the concept of trial de novo. That is, Rule 27A gave merit to the 
justice court determinations, and, under Utah case law, a trial de novo appeal 
means that the district court tries the case “unfettered by [the justice court’s] prior 
factual findings.”236 Thus, once a defendant files an appeal, due process should 
require an automatic stay of the justice court’s determinations. 
The second problem was that Rule 27A violated equal protection guarantees 
of the Utah and United States constitutions because it failed to treat all justice court 
defendants equally. Similarly situated persons should be treated alike. However, 
Rule 27A created an arbitrary distinction or litmus test at the thirty-day mark by 
outlining different procedures depending on whether the defendant was sentenced 
to jail time of thirty days or more.237 For incarceration of less than thirty days, the 
defendant’s filing of a notice of appeal amounted to a motion to stay his 
sentence.238 Thus, the defendant did not need to file anything other than his notice 
of appeal in order to have a judge consider a stay of his incarceration. Furthermore, 
within two days of receipt of the notice of appeal, a justice court judge had to order 
                                                 
232 See generally UTAH R. CRIM. P. 27A. 
233 See UTAH R. CRIM. P. 27A(a)(1) (“The filing of a notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 
38, from a judgment that includes a term requiring the defendant to actually serve a period 
of incarceration of less than 30 days is, unless a defendant indicates differently in writing, 
also a motion to stay such term of sentence. No further written motion or application is 
necessary.”). 
234 See id. at 27A(b), 38. 
235 Id. at 27A(a)(3). 
236 See Taylorsville City v. Adkins, 145 P.3d 1161, 1163 (Utah Ct. App. 2006). 
237 Compare UTAH R. CRIM. P. 27A(a) (providing procedures for obtaining a stay of 
sentence for defendants sentenced to less than 30 days of incarceration), with id. at 
27(A)(b) (providing different procedures for obtaining a stay for defendants sentenced to 
greater than thirty days of incarceration). 
238 See Id. at 27A(a)(1) (“The filing of a notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 38, from a 
judgment that includes a term requiring the defendant to actually serve a period of 
incarceration of less than 30 days is, unless a defendant indicates differently in writing, also 
a motion to stay such term of sentence. No further written motion or application is 
necessary.”). 
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a stay of the term of incarceration and release the defendant. The terms of release 
had to be the least restrictive that would “reasonably assure the appearance of the 
person as required and the safety of persons and property in the community.” 239 A 
justice court judge could refuse to order the release of a defendant if the judge 
provided a written order “indicating why the defendant poses an identifiable risk to 
the safety of another or the community and that the period of incarceration, and no 
less restrictive alternative, is necessary to reduce or eliminate that risk.”240 In 
addition, a justice court judge could elect to not release the defendant if the judge 
provided written findings that the “appeal does not appear to have a legal basis.”241  
In cases where the justice court defendant was serving a sentence that entails a 
period of incarceration of thirty days jail or more, the defendant was required to 
file not only a notice of appeal, but also file a written motion requesting the stay of 
his incarceration.242 He had to accompany his motion to stay with a memorandum 
that outlined the legal basis for the appeal, and he had to also state that delay was 
not the purpose of the appeal. The defendant had to further outline why he was not 
a flight risk and why he did not pose a danger to people in the community.243 Once 
filed, the prosecuting attorney could contest the defendant’s motion. Provided 
filing deadlines are met, a hearing would follow.244 If the justice court approved 
the defendant’s appeal, the court had to release the defendant unless it found by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was a flight risk or danger to the 
community.245 This was in contrast to the “least restrictive conditions” to be 
imposed on defendants contesting jail time of less than thirty days. Also, the 
justice court judge could amend its release order and impose additional or different 
release conditions for good cause.246 
No constitutional provision or Utah law supports giving a stronger de novo 
right to some justice court defendants over others. But, rather than giving all 
justice court defendants the same right to de novo review, Rule 27A favored 
defendants with lower sentences over those who received harsher sentences. 
In the 2012 general legislative session, Utah’s Legislature weighed into this 
issue, but ultimately fell far short of fixing the confusion regarding de novo 
appeals.247 SB 214, titled “Justice Court Process Amendments,” sponsored by Curt 
Bramble, set out to reform Utah’s de novo appeal. The text of the original bill 
would have required that “[u]pon filing a proper notice of appeal in district court 
                                                 
239 See id. at 27A(a)(2). 
240 Id. at 27A(a)(3)(A). 
241 Id. at 27A(a)(3)(B). 
242 Id. at 27A(b)(1); see also id. at 38(b) (stating deadline and content requirements). 
243 Id. at 27A (a)(3)(A). 
244 Id. at 27A(b)(2). 
245 Id. at 27A(b)(3)(A)(B). 
246 Id. at 27A(d). The justice court judge is barred from amending once the district 
court judge assigned to the appeal has scheduled or commenced hearings on a petition for 
relief from a dissatisfied party. Id. at 27A(d)(e). 
247 See Justice Court Process Amendments, Sub. S.B. 214, 59th Leg., Gen. Sess. 
(Utah 2012) (as passed by Senate, Mar. 16, 2012). 
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for a trial de novo, any sentence imposed by a justice court shall be immediately 
stayed.”248 This original language was soon substituted with language that 
guaranteed an automatic stay, “unless at the time of sentencing the judge finds by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant poses a danger to another person 
or the community.”249 Also falling short of a true de novo appeal, SB 214 provides 
that even if a sentence is stayed, justice court judges may order “post-conviction 
restrictions on the defendant’s conduct as appropriate, including: (a) continuation 
of any pre-trial restrictions or orders; (b) sentencing protective orders under 
Section 77-36-5.1; (c) drug and alcohol use; (d) use of an ignition interlock; and 
(e) posting appropriate bail.”250 The substitute bill then concludes by exempting 
convictions for offenses under Title 41, Chapter 6a, Part 5 Driving Under the 
Influence and Reckless Driving.251 
SB 214 does nothing but further muddy the already murky waters of Utah’s 
justice court system. While the original SB 214 would have brought Utah into 
compliance with basic federal due process mandates, SB 214 abandoned this 
promise by adding a metering system to determine when an automatic stay would 
apply, decided by the same judges from which the entire problem flows. Although 
the bill seems to promise an automatic stay, justice court judges appear to retain 
the ability to deny the essence of the stay—a defendant’s freedom—for a host of 
easily met requirements. 
SB 214 also exacerbates the equal protection problem at issue in Rule 27A. 
While the bill arguably gives most justice court defendants the right to an 
automatic stay, defendants convicted of DUIs are treated differently than those 
convicted of domestic violence or other serious misdemeanor offenses. With 
regard to DUIs, presumably Rule 27A would still apply. With Rule 27A, an 
arbitrary line was drawn in the sand differentiating misdemeanants who received 
less or more than thirty days’ incarceration. Under SB 214, the new arbitrary line 
in the sand was drawn for DUI convictions and non-DUI convictions. 
Unfortunately, neither line complies with the constitutional requirement of equal 
protection since there the law lacks a rational basis to distinguish a DUI 
misdemeanant from a domestic violence misdemeanant. 
While Utah’s legislature again tackled the appellate stay requirement—and 
made some progress in that area—it ultimately fell short of providing an adequate 
stay procedure that complies with constitutional commands of due process and 
equal protection. 
 
                                                 
248 Id. (as introduced, Feb. 22, 2012) (adding this language to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-
7-118(2)). 
249 Id. (as amended, Feb. 24, 2012) (adding this language to Utah Code Ann. § 77-20-
10(4)). 
250 Id. (as enrolled, Mar. 16, 2012) (adding this language to Utah Code Ann. § 77-20-
10(5)). 
251 Id. (as enrolled, Mar. 16, 2012). Ironically, the defendant in North v. Russell was 
charged with DUI.  See 427 U.S. 328, 329 (1976); infra notes 265–267 and accompanying 
text. 
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F.  Justice Court Judges Are Not Legally Trained,  
But Preside over Relatively Serious Justice Court Offenses 
 
I don’t know anything more about the law than a hog does about the 
Fourth of July.252 
 
Justice court judges need legal training, and their lack of it raises serious 
problems. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the 
right of the accused in criminal prosecutions to “have the Assistance of Counsel 
for his defense.”253 Starting with Powell v. Alabama254 and continuing through 
Gideon v. Wainright255 and Argersinger v. Hamlin,256 the United States Supreme 
Court has reaffirmed the accused’s fundamental right to assistance of counsel.257 
“[T]he essential presupposition of [this right] is that the judge conducting the trial 
will be able to understand what the defendant’s lawyer is talking about.”258 
The Utah Supreme Court has conceived that due process concerns would be 
too great to justify having nonlawyer judges preside over criminal cases.259 Most 
courts that have upheld these systems have done so only after finding that 
sufficient safeguards existed to remedy the due process concerns.260 
The leading case regarding due process concerns with nonlegally trained 
judges in criminal cases is Gordon v. Justice Court.261 In Gordon, the California 
Supreme Court was asked to determine if provisions allowing nonlawyer judges to 
preside over criminal matters were constitutional.262 The court found that 
misdemeanor trials involve sufficiently complex legal and constitutional issues that 
                                                 
252 C.B.S., supra note 50, at 1454 (quoting Justice Vernon Hilliard). 
253 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
254 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932). 
255 372 U.S. 335, 34346 (1963). 
256 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972). 
257 Id. at 32. 
258 North v. Russell, 427 U.S. 328, 342 (1976) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
259 Bernat v. Allphin, 106 P.3d 707, 717 n.13 (Utah 2005); see also Gordon v. Justice 
Court, 525 P.2d 72, 79 (Cal. 1974) (declaring state provision which allowed nonlawyer 
judges to preside over criminal cases unconstitutional because nonlawyers handling cases 
involving detailed and complicated legal issues violates due process protections); White 
House v. Whitley, 979 S.W.2d 262, 268 (Tenn. 1998) (holding that criminal defendants 
facing possible incarceration have right to law-trained judges). 
260 See North, 427 U.S. at 339 (upholding the Kentucky two-tiered system of justice 
allowing nonlawyers to preside over criminal cases because the system provided a de novo 
appeal which automatically vacated the conviction and sentence of the lower court); 
Shelmidine v. Jones, 550 P.2d 207 (Utah 1976) (declining a petition asking for a 
declaration that Utah’s justice court systemwhich allows nonlawyer judges to preside 
over criminal casesunconstitutional because of a recent statutory change that would 
provide defendants facing possible jail sentences the right to request a law-trained judge in 
the justice court). 
261 525 P.2d 72. 
262 Id. at 74. 
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exceed the expertise a layman can be assumed to possess,263 resulting in a violation 
of a defendant’s right to a fair trial.264 
Following Gordon, in North v. Russell,265 the United States Supreme Court 
upheld Kentucky’s two-tier criminal justice system, in which defendants were tried 
by nonlawyer judges, but could appeal for a de novo trial before a lawyer judge.266 
The dissent in North concerned nonlawyer judges’ ability to adjudicate the case at 
all: 
 
[A] basic constitutional right is that the judge conducting the trial will be 
able to understand what the defendant’s lawyer is talking about. For if 
the judge himself is ignorant of the law, then he, too, will be incapable of 
determining whether the charge “is good or bad.” He, too, will be 
“unfamiliar with the rules of evidence.” And a lawyer for the defendant 
will be able to do little or nothing to prevent an unjust conviction. In a 
trial before such a judge, the constitutional right to the assistance of 
counsel thus becomes a hollow mockery[,] “a teasing illusion like a 
munificent bequest in a pauper’s will.”267 
 
Utah does not require its justice court judges to be legally trained.268 In fact, 
Utah does not even require its justice court judges be college graduates.269 In 
Shelmidine v. Jones270 the Utah Supreme Court was asked to declare Utah’s two-
tiered justice system unconstitutional because it allowed nonlawyer judges to 
preside over criminal cases.271 The Shelmidine court declined, emphasizing that 
legislative action or voter referendum was the proper mechanism to change the 
state constitution and implement such a change.272 Coincidentally, while this case 
was pending the legislature amended the law to allow “a person charged with an 
                                                 
263 Id. at 75. These issues and complexities would include recognizing relevant issues, 
determining if an activity is protected, ruling properly on the admissibility of evidence, 
determining the prejudicial effects of evidence and argument, determining voir dire of 
jurors, submitting proper jury instructions, and determining if the accused understands the 
nature of the charges against him, the elements of the offense, the consequences of their 
guilty plea, and that there is a basis for the plea, and that the plea is freely and voluntarily 
made. Id. at 77. 
264 Id. at 75–77; see Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 33 (1972). 
265 427 U.S. 328, 339 (1976). 
266 Id. at 32831 (internal quotations omitted). 
267 Id. at 342–43 (quoting Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 186 (1941) (Jackson, 
J., concurring)). 
268 UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 11 (“[N]o qualification may be imposed which requires 
judges of courts not of record to be admitted to practice law.”). 
269 UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-7-201(1)–(2) (West 2008). 
270 550 P.2d 207 (Utah 1976). 
271 Id. at 209. 
272 Id. at 20910. 
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offense which carries a possible jail sentence” the “right to request that the 
proceeding be handled by a judge who is a member of the state Bar.”273 
Quick legislative action while Shelmidine was pending saved Utah’s justice 
court system by creating a means for defendants to request a legally-trained judge 
to hear their case. However, that provision has been repealed274 and under current 
Utah law, there is no longer a protection to allow a “person charged with an 
offense which carries a possible jail sentence” the right to “request that the 
proceeding be handled by a judge who is a member of the state Bar.”275 Without 
these provisions, Shelmidine is moot and due process concerns exist as long as 
justice court judges are nonlawyer judges. 
Defenders of nonlawyer justice court judges incorrectly assume that justice 
courts only handle simple cases, like dog bites or traffic offenses.276 In reality, 
justice courts frequently handle serious offenses and impose serious penalties on 
defendants. Justice court judges have jurisdiction over Class B and C 
misdemeanors and infractions.277 Class B misdemeanors carry a maximum of six 
months in jail and include offenses of domestic violence, theft, and DUI. All of 
these charges may be subsequently enhanced to felonies.278 Not only may justice 
court convictions be enhanced, but justice court defendants face several collateral 
consequences, such as deportation,279 loss of student loans, or loss of gun rights.280 
The Utah Court of Appeals and Utah Supreme Court addressed the potential 
serious consequences in Salt Lake City v. Newman in 2005281 and 2006.282 The 
defendant in the case was an active duty member of the military charged in justice 
court with battery, a Class B misdemeanor as designated by a Salt Lake City 
ordinance.283 The battery carried a domestic violence label, and Newman faced 
                                                 
273 Id. at 211. 
274 See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-7 (West 2011). 
275 Id.; Shelmidine, 550 P.2d at 211. 
276 Bates, supra note 96, at 739 (“The use of non-lawyer judges in not particularly 
problematic because in such areas most of the minor issues are sufficiently simple and 
repetitive such that a legal education is unnecessary.”). 
277 UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-7-106(1). 
278 For instance, after two misdemeanor DUI convictions, the subsequent DUI may be 
charged as a Third-degree felony, which carries a penalty of up to five years in prison. § 
41-6a-503(2) (West 2011). 
279 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101, 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) (2006). 
280 See 18 U.S.C § 922(g)(9) (“It shall be unlawful for any person . . . who has been 
convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence . . . to ship . . . or 
possess . . . any firearm or ammunition . . . .”). 
281 113 P.3d 1007 (Utah Ct. App. 2005). 
282 148 P.3d 931 (Utah 2006). 
283 See SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, CODE § 11.08.020 (2002) (“A battery is any wilful 
and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another. It is unlawful for any 
person to commit a battery within the limits of the city.”); see also Newman, 113 P.3d at 
1010 (stating battery statute at the time of the alleged violation). 
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potential discharge if convicted.284 Newman alleged that the city’s battery 
ordinance conflicted with the state code’s assault provision; the justice court 
denied his motion.285 Newman wanted to appeal the justice court’s decision, but 
could only do so by pleading guilty and appealing to the district court. However, a 
guilty plea would have rendered him unable to bear a firearm, which Newman 
worried would make him unable to perform his military duties and lead to his 
discharge.286 He pursued an extraordinary writ. The appeals court held that Mr. 
Newman faced “permanent and extraordinary” “negative consequences” from the 
de novo appellate process and agreed to review the case.287 The Court of Appeals 
ruled against Newman’s statutory interpretation and the Utah Supreme Court 
upheld the decision.288 While Newman ultimately addressed issues of statutory 
construction, the case illustrates the potential severity of consequences that justice 
court defendants may confront. 
Utah continues to have problems because it allows nonlawyer judges to 
adjudicate serious criminal offenses. By allowing nonlawyer judges to decide 
cases, courts overlook the seriousness of the charges that defendants face. These 
courts support a grave inconsistency: they mandate effective assistance of counsel 
but do not mandate that the judge deciding the case be effective as well. Utah 
courts have upheld statues allowing nonlawyers to act as justice court judges on 
grounds that they handle only minor cases.289 However, Newman demonstrates that 
justice court cases can involve offenses with potentially serious consequences. 
Utah’s justice court judges need legal training not only because they may be called 
upon to interpret the law, but also because they impose sentences and convictions 
which may greatly affect a defendant’s future. 
 
                                                 
284 Newman, 113 P.3d at 1009. This would bar the defendant from serving in the 
military because he could no longer possess a firearm. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(g)(9) (West 
2004) (“It shall be unlawful for any person . . . who has been convicted in any court of a 
misdemeanor or crime of domestic violence . . . to ship . . . or possess . . . any firearm or 
ammunition.”). 
285 Newman, 113 P.3d at 1011; see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-102(1) (LexisNexis 
2012 & Supp. 2008) (“Assault is: (a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do 
bodily injury to another; . . . or (c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that 
causes bodily injury to another or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another.”). 
286 Newman, 113 P.3d at 1007, 1009; Salt Lake City v. Kusse, 93 P.2d 671 (Utah 
1938). 
287 Newman, 113 P.3d at 1009–10. 
288 Salt Lake City v. Newman, 148 P.3d 931, 934 (Utah 2006) (“The mere fact that 
the state battery statute does not criminalize such behavior does not suggest that the 
legislature intended to authorize such behavior. Rather, the legislature may have simply 
intended to leave the regulation of such behavior in the hands of local governments, an 
intent entirely consistent with Utah Code section 10-8-47, the statute authorizing municipal 
regulation of assault and battery.”). 
289 Shelmidine v. Jones, 550 P.2d 207, 211 (Utah 1976). 
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G.  Punishments Do Not Fit the Crime 
 
Utah’s justice courts continually overuse punitive sanctions. In 2004, the 
Kalmanoff study found that justice courts overused the Salt Lake County jail, 
“often resulting in excesses.”290 Fifty-two percent of jail inmates were district court 
felony cases, while forty-three percent of the jail’s population came from justice 
courts on low-level offenses.291 “Most of these [offenders from justice courts] can 
be considered low risk and non-threatening, and certainly not the type of offenders 
that should be consuming valuable bed space in a maximum security jail.”292 Every 
inmate sentenced to a “jail or pay” sanction came from a justice court (8 percent of 
the jail’s population).293 “The average sentence imposed for ‘jail or pay’ was sixty-
six days and the average amount owed was $944.”294 Thus, justice court judges 
take relatively minor offenses and overuse incarceration as a sanction. 
Justice court judges knew they significantly contributed to the jail’s 
population, yet only a “handful” were willing to consider alternatives to 
incarceration.295 The judges felt “frustrated” the study said, that the jail would 
release their offenders early, and so imposed consecutive sentences in order to 
keep many low-level offenders in custody.296 
Part of the problem involves a lack of perspective. The most serious offenses 
justice court judges see are DUIs or domestic violence, compared with district 
courts that handle more violent and serious crimes. For the justice court judge, 
however, the DUI or domestic violence offender becomes a significant danger to 
                                                 
290 KALMANOFF STUDY, supra note 198, at 2. In 2001, the Salt Lake County Auditor 
examined municipalities’ use of the jail and concluded that several cities overused the jail 
in relationship to their population. CRAIG B. SORENSEN, A PERFORMANCE AUDIT OF THE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY JAIL 1820 (2001). The auditor found that five of the fifteen cities in 
Salt Lake County accounted for 86 percent of the jail’s municipal usage. Id. From 1997 to 
2000, these five cities’ use of the jail increased by 104 percent to 878 percent. KALMANOFF 
STUDY, supra note 198, at 3.9. “South Salt Lake [City] and Midvale, while two of the 
smallest cities in the County, were the first and third in jail usage per capita.” Id. 
291 KALMANOFF STUDY, supra note 198, at 2.3. Specifically, the jail’s population 
broke down as follow: Felony 1: three percent, Felony 2: ten percent, Felony 3: twenty-five 
percent, Misdemeanor A: thirteen percent, Misdemeanor B: forty percent, and 
Misdemeanor C: nine percent. Id. 
292 Id. at 6.9. 
293 Id. at 2.21. In fact, Utah’s constitution may well prohibit a “jail or pay” sanction. It 
prohibits “imprisonment for debt except in cases of absconding debtors.” UTAH CONST. art. 
I, § 16. 
294 KALMANOFF STUDY, supra note 198, at 2.21. The cost to incarcerate an individual 
in Salt Lake County was around $69 a day in 2001. Id. at 2.21 n.12. A sixty-six day jail 
commitment would cost County taxpayers $4,554, nearly five times the average amount 
owed by the offender. Id. 
295 Id. at 6.10; see also id. at 3.9 (“The municipalities and the Justice Courts greatly 
rely on the Metro Jail” and use it “essentially with little restriction and complete financial 
impunity.”). 
296 Id. at 6.10. 
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the community who deserves a steep punishment such as incarceration. As a result 
many judges tend to impose the maximum sentence possible, 180 days jail time. 
Penalties for multiple counts are often imposed consecutively. However, though 
this offender might be a danger to the community, his level of offense is 
significantly less than felons who are seen in district court and who does not 
deserve as severe a sanction.297  
Additionally, the variation in punishment among justice courts can be drastic. 
For example, the average length of a jail sentence imposed by a Holliday justice 
court was 344 days compared to twenty-two days for the South Salt Lake Justice 
Court.298 South Salt Lake City filed cases at a rate of ninety-five per 1,000 
residents, while on the opposite end of the spectrum, Draper filed cases at a rate of 
five per 1,000 residents.299 The average felony sentence amounted to over 300 
days, while justice court defendants’ sentences averaged around eighty-three 
days.300 The Taylorsville Justice Court sentenced its defendants to an average 
sentence of 180 days, while the Draper Justice Court sentenced its defendants to 
stays averaging thirty-four days.301  
Because of the abuses, largely in justice courts, the Institute made several 
recommendations for reform, including automatic appeal for disproportionate 
sentences from justice courts,302 institution of a community service program to 
allow defendants to work off sentences (rather than sit in jail),303 creation of 
sentencing guidelines for Class B and C misdemeanors,304 and jail management 
policies such as quotas,305 and charging the municipality a per diem for 
incarceration of defendants for certain minor offenses.306 
Utah uses justice courts to bring a local flavor to its process. However, the 
problems created with locally administered justice result in significant 
constitutional violations and deprivations to the rights of defendants. 
Consequently, the system needs reformation. 
 
                                                 
297 Id. at 3.4 (“To some degree, this occurrence is a natural development within the 
Justice Courts as certain offenses or offenders emerge as major issues for the court, 
impacting their sense of internal relativity.”). 
298 Id. at 2.18. 
299 Id. at 3.22. 
300 See id. at 2.1920. 
301 Id. at 2.20. 
302 Id. at 6.26. This would result, the study said, in having the district court hear the 
cases, which would cause “standardized sentencing” and “predictable timelines as well as 
reduced incarceration costs.” Id. While this would increase the district courts’ calendars 
temporarily, it would cause “sentencing and timelines in the justice courts [to] fall into 
more of a middle-position norm.” Id. 
303 Id. at 6.20. 
304 Id. at 8.5. 
305 Id. at 6.13. 
306 Id. at 3.12. 
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III.  PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS OF UTAH’S JUSTICE COURTS 
 
The numerous and persistent problems inherent to the justice courts demand 
significant reform. The failure to address them deprives Utah’s citizens of 
constitutional rights and undermines the legitimacy of the courts. To remedy these 
serious problems, Utah should abolish its justice courts. Alternatively, if justice 
courts must remain, Utah should implement several reforms to protect the integrity 
of the judicial system and those who find themselves within it. 
 
A.  Abolish Justice Courts Statewide and Replace Them  
with Magistrate Courts under the State System 
 
The most logical solution to the courts’ problems and clearest course of action 
would be to abolish the courts in their entirety. Indeed, abolition has been the 
most-often proposed remedy since the courts’ inception.307 The history of justice 
courts reveals that the reasons for their creation no longer exist. Justice courts were 
created for a society in which the rule of law was less important than a sense of 
community justice. Members of rural America preferred a system in which 
nonlawyers would resolve disputes in a down-to-earth, practical, nonlegal way. 
When justice courts were created, lawyers were few in number and court buildings 
were few and far between. 
Today, every one of these justifications has been eliminated. The complexities 
of the law show that legal training for justices is essential, and indeed important to 
maintain the integrity of the justice system. Moreover, we no longer have a 
shortage of lawyers: Utah has thousands of lawyers and admits hundreds to the bar 
annually. Utahns no longer live in a time in which people lack access to the courts. 
The advent and growth of automobiles makes it possible to travel the length and 
breadth of the state in half a day. The Internet and other technologies enable courts 
to communicate with people remotely. Thus, when people are unable to travel to 
the court, the court has the capacity to go to the people, like Utah’s current practice 
of conducting arraignments at the jail via video monitor. Additionally, the history 
of the justice courts reveals that they are staffed all too frequently by nonlawyers 
who, when given the opportunity, abuse and overstep their authority. 
Moreover, abolition ensures judicial independence. Municipalities could no 
longer press their revenue-generation goals onto their justice courts, since judges 
would act as state employees, with all the benefits and independence established 
with that position. Abolition ensures that only legally trained judges have the 
heavy responsibility of deciding criminal cases. It also reins in the problem of 
excessive and uneven punishment for crimes. Utah would be wise to follow the 
majority of states in the United States and abolish its justice of the peace courts. 
Indeed, Utah’s own legislative commission recommended this solution nearly four 
decades ago after an intensive, multi-year study.308 
                                                 
307 See supra Part I. 
308 See UTAH LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, supra note 97, at 19. 
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Of course, abolition of the justice courts will leave a gap in the justice system. 
To fill this void, the state could create a magistrate court system filled with legally 
trained judges. These legally trained magistrates would possess the authority to 
handle misdemeanor and felony initial appearances, much in the same way that 
matters are handled in federal court. In this way, magistrates would function in a 
manner similar to the way justice court judges function today. A district court 
magistrate, as a state employee, could handle the tens of thousands of 
misdemeanor crimes now filed and handled by the justice courts. 
However, to ensure Utah avoids future problems, several fundamental 
changes must also accompany abolition of the justice court system and the creation 
of the magistrate courts. First, magistrates’ decisions must be appealable to the 
district court, similar to a traditional appeal. Because district court proceedings are 
“on the record,” there would be no entitlement to a de novo appeal, but rather an 
appeal that more closely resembles the appeals process from a federal magistrate 
court. The district court judge could review the record, entertain motions and 
arguments and rule on the constitutionality of the trial below. After appeal to the 
district court, the party may pursue a writ of certiorari for a discretionary appeal to 
the Utah Supreme Court. This system would reduce the appearances a witness 
would be required to make in court or for discovery because of the existence of a 
reliable record. Above all, such a process would protect defendants’ and society’s 
rights and interests. 
Second, the new magistrate judges must be legally trained. This will ensure 
that the judge understands both the nuances of the case and the law itself, and it 
will prevent arbitrary decisions and sentences. The new courts should have little 
problem attracting qualified candidates to serve because magistrate judges would 
get the benefit of a steady job and the prestige associated with being a state court 
judge, to say nothing of a state salary and benefits. 
In sum, if Utah were to abolish the justice courts and put all courts under a 
single statewide umbrella, the benefits to its citizens would greatly outweigh any 
costs associated with individual municipalities determining on a varied basis how 
they will deliver criminal justice services. 
 
B.  Alternatively, the Following Reforms Should Be Made to the Justice Courts 
 
Many do not favor completely abolishing justice courts, frequently arguing 
that their benefits offset their downsides.309 If the state of Utah is not fully 
                                                 
309 For example, in 2008, Salt Lake City Chief Justice Court Judge Virginia Ward 
argued that the justice court was “more accessible in every way” and that the costs of 
having to appeal cases were quite minimal: the “200 [appealed] cases need to be balanced 
against the 54,250 for which no additional resources are expended.” SALT LAKE CITY, 
JUSTICE COURT FACT SHEET 10 (2008) (reporting to the Salt Lake City Council on June 10, 
2008). She argued that “[t]here are costs, but they should be balanced against the gain to 
citizens of having speedy trials, to the City of not having District Court judges refuse to 
give due efforts to City cases, to having judges who will not deny the City’s right to present 
misdemeanor cases.” Id. 
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committed to abolishing the courts, then it should implement the following 
reforms. 
 
1.  Establish an Independent Judiciary 
 
Utah must insulate its judiciary from political pressure. In short, Utah Code 
section 78A-7-210 should be amended to remove the requirement that justice court 
judges comply with applicable county or municipal rules and regulations related to 
personnel, budgets, and other administrative functions, so that judges no longer 
feel administrative pressures to maintain budgets through court fees and fines. 
Additionally, all justice court judges should be state employees. Title 10 does 
not provide for a municipal judicial branch of government, and as such the justice 
courts violate the separation of powers principle. And as discussed above, there are 
still significant revenue generation pressures on the judges. Rather than amending 
Title 10 to create a statewide municipal judicial branch, justice court judges should 
be made state employees. The current method for selecting justice court judges 
should be preserved, and all court employees, including court managers and court 
clerks, should remain as currently constituted. To remedy the violation of 
separation of powers, and to avoid the appearance of impropriety, municipalities 
should not employ justice court judges. 
 
2.  Require Justice Court Judges to be Legally Trained 
 
Any reform must require legal training for justice court judges. Justice courts 
are no longer the backwoods, justice out of one’s home, type of court. Justice 
courts act as official courts. Judges wear robes and sentence defendants to lengthy 
periods of incarceration, sometimes for years at a time. These courts have bailiffs, 
seat juries, are required to follow the rules of evidence, and hear motions to 
suppress evidence. Justice court judges analyze statutes, rules, and constitutions, 
and make important legal conclusions. Judges make decisions that dramatically 
affect the lives of numerous Utahns throughout the state. Moreover, the law, and 
all its procedural nuances, is complex. Few citizens would want to certify doctors 
who did not go to medical school. Schooling prepares doctors for the complexities 
of their practices. Similarly, law school prepares future judges to think like 
lawyers. We must require those charged with such responsibility to meet certain 
professional standards and requirements. It is not too much to ask a person in such 
a position to pass law school and the bar exam in order to demonstrate a capacity 
to understand and interpret the law. All things being equal, lawyers (taken as a 
group) are more capable of determining and interpreting the law than nonlawyers. 
We do citizens a great disservice to continue to allow a frontier justification for 
resolving legal disputes to persist well into the twenty-first century. We must set 
minimum standards for our judges, and that standard should be to have lawyers 
serving in these positions. 
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3.  Set Sentencing Guidelines and Restrict Courts’ Ability to Overuse Consecutive 
Sentences 
 
Perhaps the most significant problem in justice court sentencing involves the 
lack of standardization among the courts. Some justice courts excessively sentence 
offenders to relatively long periods of incarceration and others have consistently 
overused incarceration for relatively minor offenses. Others have a more moderate 
approach. A committee, composed of justice court judges, district court judges, 
state supreme court justices and court administrators, needs to set justice court 
sentencing guidelines. These guidelines should also include a much higher use of 
community-based sanctions, rather than incarceration. When a justice court judge 
imposes a jail commitment, he needs to know what a standardized sentence would 
be.310 Of course, justice court judges should have the flexibility to deviate from the 
guidelines in individual cases within their discretion. But sentencing guidelines 
would ensure that judges refrain from imposing unreasonably disproportionate or 
excessive punishments for crimes. 
Additionally, the legislature should address the issue of the overuse of 
consecutive sentencing by justice court judges. Since the matters in front of them 
carry a maximum of 180 days incarceration, justice court judges should not be 
allowed to impose more than one consecutive sentence. If justice court judges have 
the ability to take minor offenses, like multiple traffic offenses, and run them 
consecutively for years at a time, they are clearly exceeding proper sentences for 
the offenses for which they have jurisdiction. A sentence over one year in custody 
enters felony territory, which the district courts should properly handle. Justice 
court judges should not have the option of wandering into this realm. Legislation 
should be proposed to limit a justice court judge’s ability to exceed one year of 
incarceration. 
 
4.  Make Justice Courts Record Their Proceedings and Allow Supervision  
by Higher Courts 
 
At a bare minimum, Utah should at least require proceedings of justice courts 
to be recorded. We no longer live on the frontier. Recording equipment is easily 
obtainable and relatively inexpensive. Because justice courts are not courts of 
record, much of what happens there is completely unreviewable. This results in 
additional costs to the state, which on appealed cases, must put on recurring trials 
and force witnesses to repeatedly come to court. Additionally, the actions of justice 
court judges cannot be reviewed by a higher court or by the public at large, since 
proceedings are not recorded. In a sense, a justice court’s proceedings disappear as 
soon as they occur. Because of minimal cost and the benefits of an open court 
policy, the state should require its courts to record proceedings. 
                                                 
310 For example, the guidelines could say one to two days for a first DUI, ten to fifteen 
for a second, etc. An unsure judge could then review the guidelines and approach 
sentencing accordingly. 
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Admittedly, this recommendation raises potential constitutional issues. Article 
VIII, section 11, of Utah’s Constitution states that “no qualification may be 
imposed which requires judges of courts not of record to be admitted to practice 
law,”311 whereas article VIII, section 7 states that judges of courts of record must 
have been “admitted to practice law in Utah.”312 What is not clear is whether 
recording the proceedings of justice courts, and allowing this record to be reviewed 
by a higher judge, makes justice courts into courts of record. 
In the most recent Utah legislative session, the House and Senate passed a bill 
giving Utah justice courts one year, until July 1, 2012, to purchase and install 
recording equipment.313 These records will not, however, be used for appellate 
review; rather, these recordings will be used for the limited purpose of judicial 
conduct complaints. If this law is challenged, any decision rendered will allow a 
glimpse into the potential ramifications of creating a record in justice courts. Utah 
must take the next step and require these recording devises to be allowed in 
subsequent hearings and appeals. 
 
5.  We Must Streamline and Improve the Appeal Process, Including Imposing 
Automatic Stays When Justice Court Sentences Are Appealed 
 
Less than 1 percent of justice court cases in the state of Utah are appealed to 
the district court on a trial de novo appeal.314 Yet the process engenders confusion 
and can result in several inequities. A defendant sentenced to jail on a DUI will not 
have his jail sentence stayed pending appeal, while a defendant sentenced to jail on 
a domestic violence could be instantly freed once he files a notice of appeal. The 
harm, especially over a fairly minor matter, will have already passed by the time a 
district court can step in to remedy the situation. 
The trial de novo appeal process would be improved by requiring that if a 
defendant—on any misdemeanor—appeals his sentence from justice court, the 
sentence should be automatically stayed and he or she should revert to the position 
the defendant was in before the justice court imposed the sentence. Significantly, 
so long as the state advocates a de novo review, the defendant will revert 
automatically to innocence and the justice court conviction and sentence will be 
                                                 
311 UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 11. 
312 Id. § 7. 
313 Justice Court Modifications, S.B. 318, 2011 Gen. Assemb. (Utah, Mar. 16, 2011) 
(amending UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-7-103). The bill passed both houses and was enrolled 
March 16, 2011. The added language is as follows: “(3) Notwithstanding Subsections (1) 
and (2), the Judicial Council may only create or certify a justice court that, on or before 
July 1, 2012, records its proceedings with a digital audio recording device and maintains 
the audio recordings for a minimum of one year.” UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-7-103 (West 
2011). 
314 JUSTICE COURT FACT SHEET, supra note 309, at 9. Of 40,343 traffic cases, a total 
of thirteen were appealed. Id. In the Salt Lake City justice court in 2007, of 14,107 criminal 
cases, a total of 189 were appealed to the district court. Id. 
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completely wiped clean. The automatic stay, as articulated above, also prevents 
potential violations of due process.315 
Justice court judges might be concerned that certain defendants could be a 
danger to the community. If these defendants were to be released, then the judge—
or the community—might feel that this person should remain in custody pending 
appeal. However, it is inconsistent to lock up justice court defendants pending 
appeal considering the de novo process mandates a wiping away of the justice 
court conviction and sentence. No matter this person’s danger to the community, 
her conviction will be eliminated and her sentence will be vacated if she pursues a 
de novo appeal. As long as the de novo process remains in place, then it is 
extremely difficult to justify continued detention on the basis of the justice court 
conviction alone. Clearly, the easiest way to solve the problem is to allow the 
prosecution to go to the district court and request a warrant. However, if Utah is 
not committed to completely wiping the custody situation clean, the justice court 
judge could have the flexibility to order the defendant held on bail consistent with 
the bail schedule for the offense. The judge would then be required to enter a bail 
setting within twenty-four hours of receiving the appeal. That bail order may then 
be reviewed within seventy-two hours by the district court judge on his or her 
regular arraignment calendar. 
Currently, the appellate statute makes arbitrary distinctions between DUIs and 
other misdemeanor offenses. It also allows the justice court judge too much leeway 
to continue to incarcerate an individual who will automatically receive a de novo 
trial and clean slate. The above recommendation best preserves competing 
interests. That is, it recognizes the inevitability of a fresh start and requires an 
automatic stay of the sentence, but it allows for community protection by 
permitting the justice court judge to impose bail. 
 
6.  Amend Justice Courts’ Jurisdiction to Remove Enhanceable Cases 
 from Their Jurisdiction 
 
From crimes involving domestic violence to DUIs, justice courts preside over 
a myriad of criminal matters which are not only serious and potentially 
complicated, but enhanceable—meaning a conviction in justice court could be 
used to increase the severity of future, related, criminal offenses. For example, a 
DUI is ordinarily filed as a Class B misdemeanor. After a person’s second 
conviction for DUI, any subsequent DUI within a ten-year period may be filed as a 
third-degree felony. Similarly, a person’s first two theft convictions, assuming the 
value is under $500, are Class B misdemeanors. A person’s third theft charge is a 
third-degree felony, regardless of the value of the stolen item(s). Crimes involving 
domestic violence are increased by one degree after an initial conviction. For 
example, a person who is convicted of simple assault, domestic violence, a Class B 
                                                 
315 See North v. Russell, 427 U.S. 328, 339 (1976); Bernat v. Allphin, 106 P.3d 707, 
717 (Utah 2005) (acknowledging conceivable due process violations with burdensome stay 
requirements, though no violation was found in the facts at issue). 
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misdemeanor, would faced enhancements of one degree (Class B to Class A 
misdemeanor, Third-degree to Second-degree felony, etc.) for each subsequent 
charge involving domestic violence. 
In other words, justice courts do not simply hear minor matters of little 
consequence. The justice court often invokes the image of a traffic court. But these 
courts adjudicate serious offenses, which may result in major deprivations of 
liberty and major consequences to offenders. If Utah is committed to retaining its 
justice courts, then they should return their jurisdiction to the minor matters they 





Justice of the peace courts were created to bring justice to the people. For 
centuries, they have accomplished this goal, often with ridicule, but also with 
respect. However, in the twenty-first century, the benefits of having locally 
administered justice have long expired. Utah’s justice of the peace courts look and 
feel exactly like district courts, yet they lack the benefits and protections afforded 
to citizens charged with more serious offenses. Some of Utah’s justice courts lack 
experienced legally-trained judges. Most of Utah’s justice courts lack judges who 
are independent of the financial concerns and priorities of their municipalities. 
They frequently impose harsh sentences on offenders based on the relatively minor 
nature of their offenses. They also frequently ignore basic constitutional 
protections, such as the right to counsel and the other legal issues. A crucial 
concern is the lack of meaningful appellate review. 
Utah should strongly consider abolishing its justice courts in order to integrate 
them into a statewide system of justice that would “keep the peace” for all of the 
state’s citizens. If Utah does not abolish its justice courts, then it should implement 
the procedures and reforms outlined in this Article. Utah continues to have an 
opportunity to provide meaningful, and constitutional, justice administered at its 
local level. Once these reforms were implemented, Utah could return once again to 
a system of local courts that could truly be called courts of justice. 
